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I. INTRODUCTION
Beginning in 1959, the Cuban government expropriated the property of
Cuban nationals, U.S. companies and individuals, and foreign investors from
other countries. U.S. individuals and corporations subject to U.S. jurisdic-
tion at the time of the expropriations filed property claims requesting indem-
nification with the U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, which
certified 5,913 claims.2 Expropriation involves political risk because an eco-
nomic loss arises not from a market outcome but, instead, results from state
action. These political risk claims remain outstanding at a value (with inter-
est) of about $8 billion, although many claimants have already recovered
some or all of their investment through deductions on their federal income
tax returns.3 Much ink has been spilled on these certified claims.4 For ex-
ample, the American Bar Association's Section on Taxation has argued that
any future recoveries on these claims should not be taxable, in contravention
of tax benefit principles that require inclusion in gross income of recovered
items formerly deducted.'
When Cuba first expropriated the property of U.S. nationals after the
Revolution, President Eisenhower cut the island's sugar import quota and
imposed a partial trade embargo.6 Expanded by President Kennedy, subse-
quent presidents, and Congress, these sanctions - a form of economic coer-
cion - have now continued for 57 years.7 The sanctions limit the way that
persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction must refrain from travel to and involve-
ment with Cuba. In so doing, these sanctions also create political risk be-
cause they create uncertainty about whether an individual or corporation will
2 The U.S. Department of Justice publishes a list identifying the original owner and the
face value of each claim. See U.S. DOJ, FOREIGN CLAIM SETTLEMENT COMMISSION OF THE
UNITED STATES CUBAN CLAIMS PROGRAM CERTPIED CLAIMANT LisT (2009), https://
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/fcsc/docs/ccp-listofclaims.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/
NRP8-ZGDH.
See Thomas L. Wolfe and John B. White, Income Tax Consequences of Cuban Expropri-
ations to Cuban Resident Aliens, 19 U. MIAMI L. Rrv. 591, 614 (1965).
4 A general Lexis search for law review articles on the subject turns up over fifty articles.
Journalists have also covered the issue extensively. See, e.g., Nick Miroff, The 20 Largest U.S.
Property Claims in Cuba, WASH. PosT (Dec. 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
worldviews/wp/2015/12/08/the-20-largest-u-s-property-claims-in-cuba/?utm term=.317d4baO
cbe3, archived at https://perma.cc/97D7-WY3Q; Richard Feinberg, Reconciling U.S. Property
Claims in Cuba: Transforming Trauma Into Opportunity, BROOKINGS INST. (2015), available
at https://www.brookings.edulwp-content/uploads/2016/07/Reconciling-US-Property-Claims-
in-Cuba-Feinberg.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/7XLK-HVMN.
' See Letter from George Howell, Chair, Tax'n Sec., to Mary Mcleod, Principal Deputy
Legal Advisor, United States Dep't of St. (Feb. 17, 2016), http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/abaladministrative/taxation/policy/021716comments.authcheckdam.pdf, archived at
https://perma.cc/529X-ZRZG; Timothy Ashby and Tania Mastrapa, Taxation of Cuban Confis-
cated Assets After Property Claims Settlement: Issues for Taxpayers and the U.S. Government,
in 15 AssN FOR THE STUDY OF THE CUBAN EcoN., CUBA IN TRANSITION 157, 160 (2005),
available at http://www.ascecuba.org/c/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/v15-ashbymastrapa.pdf,
archived athttps://perma.cc/VTA5-PAXW.
6 See infra text accompanying notes 59-60.
See infra text accompanying notes 95-101.
52 Vol. 20
Spring 2017 Cuba's Embargo Claims Against the United States
be punished for not obeying sanctions. These authorities are complex, over-
lapping, and ambiguous, reflecting several decades of executive rule-making
and, more recently, Congressional action.' Over time, these sanctions have
morphed into a progressively more aggressive intervention in Cuba's domes-
tic and international economic activities.' Without formally declaring war
on Cuba, the United States has also carried out covert operations designed to
oust the sitting Cuban government."o
The United States is the world's most active user of unilateral economic
sanctions, but the scope and structure of those against Cuba are without
peer." These sanctions have been condemned by several U.N. entities, in-
cluding the General Assembly, the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
the Food and Agriculture Organization, the Children's Fund, UNESCO, and
the World Health Organization.12 In particular, international health organiza-
tions have criticized the way that sanctions have compromised the health of
Cubans by limiting access to pharmaceuticals, food, water treatment chemi-
cals, and medical equipment, which became direly needed after Congress
began assuming more control over sanctions. 3 Not only have sanctions on
Cuba lasted longer than any other in modern history, but they have also been
enforced with exceptional rigor. Since 2009, six of the largest thirteen fines
imposed on foreign banks for violating U.S. sanctions have involved Cuba,
although the banks in question also provided banking services to other sanc-
tioned countries.1 4 Four of these Cuba-related fines exceeded $500 million,
' The legal authority for U.S. sanctions on Cuba derives from a blend of federal statute,
executive decisions, and administrative policies. Federal statutes like the Foreign Aid Appro-
priation Act of 1961, the Export Control Act, and the Trading with The Enemy Act conferred
discretionary authority on the President to impose additional economic sanctions designed by
the executive branch. The Congressional Research Service has an excellent report that com-
prehensively charts the legal authorities that undergird U.S. sanctions on Cuba. See DIANNE E.
RENNACK AND MARK P. SULLIVAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43888, CUBA SANCTIONS: LEG-
ISLATIVE RESTRICTIONS LIMITING THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS (2017).
'See generally LA SOCIEDAD CUBANA DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL, AGRESIONES DE Es-
TADOS UNIDOS A CUBA REVOLUCIONARIA: ANUARIO 1989 (1989) (comprehensively examining
military, social, economic, and ideological efforts of the United States to intervene in Cuban
society); NICANoR LEON CorAYO, SIN RAMO DE Ouvo: LAS RELACIONES CUBANO-ESTADOU-
NIDENSES BAIO EL GOBIERNO DE RONALD REAGAN (1988); JANE FRANKLIN, CUBA ESTADOS
UNIDOS: CRONOLOGiA DE UNA HISTORIA (2015).
10 These include the invasion of Playa Gir6n (Bay of Pigs), activities of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency, and the actions of non-state actors deemed to be supported by the U.S. gov-
ernment. See infra note 33; see also infra text accompanying note 229.
" These include the following: Afghanistan, Belarus, Burma, Burundi, the Central African
Republic, the Ivory Coast, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya,
North Korea, Russia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Venezuela, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. See Steve
Eisner, Export Controlled or Embargoed Countries, Entities and Persons, STANFORD UNIV.
(Dec. 15, 2016), https://doresearch.stanford.edu/research-scholarshiplexport-controls/export-
controlled-or-embargoed-countries-entities-and-persons#countries, archived at https://perma.
cc/3T84-8SJP.
2 See NIGEL D. WHITE, THE CUBAN EMBARGO UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: EL BLO-
QUEO, 119-120 (2015) [hereinafter EL BLOQUEO].
13 See id. at 121-22.
14 BNP Paribas was fined 8.9 billion for banking services provided to Cuba, Sudan, and
Iran (2014); both ING (619 million, 2012) and Credit Suisse (536 million, 2009) were fined
for dealing with Cuba and Iran; ABN Amaro (500 million, 2010) and HSBC (375 billion,
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with one bank being fined almost $9 billion." This attempt to isolate Cuba
has taken place during a period in which global markets went in the other
direction, becoming more interdependent.' 6
This article examines Cuba's claim for damages against the United
States for its hostile policies towards the island, including economic sanc-
tions. In a 2016 report to the United Nations, Cuba estimated the value of its
forgone revenues due to U.S. policy at over $125 billion.17 This amount
represented an increase of more than $4.5 billion from the previous year.' 8
In effect, these claims for damages act as a political risk counterclaim to the
certified claims, in addition to the more than $270 million in Cuban assets
frozen in the United States as a result of sanctions. 9 In 1999, a Cuban court
also heard two separate legal actions against the United States for harms
caused by sanctions. One complaint was a mass tort action estimating the
cost of wrongful death, physical injury, and consequential damages caused
by the attempts of the U.S. government to interfere with national security. 20
A second complaint focuses on harm to the economy from U.S. sanctions.2'
2012) were each fined for transacting with Cuba, Iran, Libya, and Sudan; and the Royal Bank
of Scotland was fined 100 million for serving Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Burma. See JONATHAN
MASTERS, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, WHAT ARE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS? (2017), avail-
able at https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-are-economic-sanctions, archived at https://
perma.cc/RLL7-DDLS.
15 Id.
" See infra text accompanying notes 236-243.
17 Cuba's estimates distinguish between patrimonial harm (which represents a diminution
in the value of property) and damages, which measure foregone revenues. Cuba seeks com-
pensation only for the lost revenues, not the patrimonial losses. See INFORME DE CUBA SOBRE
LA RESOLUCI6N 70/5 DE LA ASAMBLEA GENERAL DE LAS NACIONFS UNIDAS, TITULADA
"NECESIDAD DE PONER FIN AL BLOQUEO ECON6Mico, COMERCIAL Y FINANCIERO IMPUESTO
POR Los EsTADOS UNIDOS DE AMIRICA CONTRA CUBA," 21-29 (June 2016) [hereinafter 2016
CUBA REPORT], available at http://www.cubadebate.cu/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Necesi
dad-de-poner-fin-al-bloqueo-econ%C3%B3mico-comercial-y-financiero-impuesto-por-los-Es
tados-Unidos-de-Am%C3%A9rica-contra-Cuba.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/5ADF-
USVW (analyzing the ongoing impact of U.S. sanctions after President Obama's 2016 visit to
Cuba).
" Nevertheless, the 2016 figure reflected a decrease of over $80 billion in patrimonial
harm from the previous year. See INFORME DE CUBA SOBRE LA RESOLUCION 69/5 DE LA ASAM-
BLEA GENERAL DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS, TITULADA "NECESIDAD DE PONER MIN AL BLOQUEO
EcON6Mico, COMERCIAL Y FINANCIERO IMPUESTO POR LOs ESTADOS UNEDOS DE AMERICA
CONTRA CUBA," (June 2015) [hereinafter 2015 CUBA REPORT], available at http://www.cuba
vsbloqueo.cu/sites/default/files/INFORME%20BLOQUEO%202015%20Esp.pdf, archived at
https://perma.cc/UMZ3-YTRX (analyzing sanctions harms after the beginning of diplomatic
normalization on December 17, 2014).
9 Id. at 31.
20 Juan Mendoza Dfaz, et al., Demanda del Pueblo de Cuba al Gobrieno de Estados
Unidos por Dados Humanos, La Sala de lo Civil y de lo Administrativo del Tribunal Provin-
cial Popular de Cuidad de la Habana (May 31, 1999) [hereinafter Security Complaint].
21 Mima Nides Dominguez, et al., Demanda del Pueblo Cubano al Gobrieno de los Es-
tados Unidos por Daiios Economicos Ocasionados a Cuba, La Sala de lo Civil y de lo Ad-
ministrativo del Tribunal Provincial Popular de Cuidad de la Habana (Jan. 3, 2000) [hereinafter
Economic Complaint].
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As of yet, though, the U.S. legal literature has ignored Cuba's claim
against the United States. 2  No coincidence, this omission is itself a product
of U.S. sanctions, which restrain not only economic ties with the island but
also the production of knowledge about Cuba. Before the Revolution, the
two countries enjoyed robust academic and professional exchange. Cubans
came to the United States to study medicine, engineering, business, den-
tistry, finance, and agronomy.23 U.S. scientists traveled to Cuba to perform
field research in botany, archaeology, and meteorology.2 4 This ended after
the U.S. broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba and has never been re-
stored, resulting in a kind of national academic segregation with prominent
exception of the robust Cuban studies activities of the Latin American Stud-
ies Association. 2 5
When does economic coercion through sanctions violate another coun-
try's sovereignty? 26 What remedies does a country subjected to long-stand-
ing economic coercion have against the offending country? It is on these
questions that the future of Cuba's embargo claims rests. Public interna-
tional law permits a country to unilaterally impose economic sanctions on
another country for a variety of reasons, including self-help in response to
aggression.2 7 In some circumstances, a country can even violate traditional
limits on sovereignty in order to protect the human rights.28 The United
States defends its sanctions by saying that they promote the freedom and
human rights of the "Cuban people," a notion central to U.S. policy on
Cuba. 9 Cuba and the General Assembly of the United Nations disagree,
deeming U.S. sanctions an illegal blockade under public international law.30
22 1 examined it briefly in an earlier essay linking property claims to tensions in Cuban-
American identity. See Jose M. Gabilondo, Cuban Claims: Embargoed Identities and the Cu-
ban-American Oedipal Conflict (el grito de la Yuma), 9 RUTGERS RACE & L. REv. 335 (2008)
[hereinafter Cuban Claims].
23 LATIN AM. WORKING GROUP EDUC. FUND, RETREAT FROM REASON: U.S.-CUBAN ACA-
DEMIC RELATIONS AND THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 12 (2006).
24 Id.
25 Id. at 15.
26 Eminent Cuban jurist Rodolfo D~valos has written the most comprehensive analysis of
the legality and legitimacy under public international law of U.S. sanctions on Cuba. See
RODOLFo DAvALos FERNANDEZ, EMBARGO o BooQUEO? LA [NSTRUMENTACON DE UN CRIMEN
CONTRA CUBA (2012) [hereinafter EMBARGO o BLOQUtO]. Nigel White has also published an
extended analysis of the legality of U.S. sanctions against Cuba and the island's 's claim for
embargo losses. See EL BLOQUEO, supra note 12.
27 J. Vurtis Henderson, Legality of Economic Sanctions Under International Law: The
Case of Nicaragua, 43 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 167 (1986); Helen Osieja, Economic Sanctions as
an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy 63 (Aug. 2005) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ameri-
can University of London).
' See infra text accompanying notes 224-230.
29 Ambassador Ronald D. Godard, U.S. Mission to the U.N., Speech to the U.N. General
Assembly (Oct. 30, 2014), available at https://www.humanrights.gov/dynlexplanation-of-vote-
on-the-cuba-resolution-in-the-general-assembly-hall.html, archived at https://perma.cclRQB5-
VTW9 (explaining U.S. vote against the U.N. resolution).
30 See Press Release, General Assembly, As General Assembly Demands End to Cuba
Blockade for Twenty-Third Consecutive Year, Country's Foreign Minister Cites Losses Ex-
ceeding $1 Trillion, U.N. Press Release GA/I 1574 (Oct. 28, 2014); Security Complaint, supra
note 20; Economic Compliant, supra note 21; Until recently, Cuba's claims against the United
55
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In this view, U.S. sanctions on Cuba violate limits on acceptable forms of
bilateral economic aggression.
Much is at stake in recognizing Cuba's right to damages for embargo
losses, including the possible resolution of the certified property claims
against Cuba.31 At present, Cuba lacks the liquidity necessary to settle any
property claims, but a transfer payment from the United States under the
rubric of consolidated claims settlement would make it possible for the U.S.
holders of certified claims to recover. This would occur by netting Cuba's
claim against the United States with the outstanding certified claims as part
of consolidated claims settlement. So, the U.S. holders of certified claims
against Cuba might also favor recognition by the United States of liability
for embargo losses.32
This Article concludes that U.S. sanctions violate public international
law, hence creating sovereign liability in favor of Cuba. My conclusion re-
jects the view - dominant in Congress and elsewhere - that Cuba's sover-
eignty is somehow impaired or compromised because of the Cuban
Revolution or actions taken by Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, or the Cuban gov-
ernment, including actions deemed antidemocratic. Urging - as this Arti-
cle does - that the United States assume financial responsibility for its
improper harms to the island affirms the sovereignty of the Cuba as it is
now, whether the island's government and state structure remain exactly as
they are today or whether changes someday follow. In doing so, this Article
ends the scholarly silence in the U.S. legal literature about this important
topic.
In particular, this Article argues that the United States has liability for
these sanctions because they have promoted regime change in Cuba in ways
that violate contemporary notions of sovereignty. In his meticulous history
of negotiations between Cuba and the United States, William LeoGrande
argues that promoting regime change in Cuba has been the goal of U.S.
foreign policy continuously since 1959.13 While true, this Article divides
States seemed moot to most because the two countries broke off diplomatic relations in 1961.
That changed suddenly on December 17, 2014, when U.S. President Barack Obama and Cuban
President Raul Castro announced that the two countries would resume diplomatic ties. Diplo-
matic normalization makes more likely that the two countries will work towards settling their
offsetting political risk claims. Indeed, already negotiators for the United States and Cuba have
begun discussing the issue. See WILLIAM M. LEOGRANDE & PETER KORNBLUH, BACK CHAN-
NEL TO CUBA: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF NEGOTIATIONs BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND HAVANA
449-53 (2015) [hereinafter BACK CHANNEL].
' Jos6 Gabilondo, Making Sense of Today's Cuban Economy: Promises in the Making,
HUFFINGTON PosT (June 8, 2015), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jose-gabilondo/
making-sense-of-todays-cuban-economy-promises-in-the-making_b_75273 80.html, archived
at https://perma.cclE9DC-F823 (urging concerted action to reduce political risk in the Cuban
economy).
32 Cuban Claims, supra note 22, at 119-121.
33 See Back Channel, supra note 30, at 356; see also William M. LeoGrande, The End of
the Bogeyman: The Political Repercussions of the U.S.-Cuban Rapprochement, in A NEW
CHAPTER IN US-CUBA RELATIONS: SOCIAL, POLrrICAL, AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONs 53 (Er-
ich Hershberg & William M. LeoGrande eds., 2016).
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sanctions on Cuba into three discrete periods during which U.S. policy pur-
sued regime change differently.
During the first period, regime change remained a covert objective, dis-
guised behind an explicit policy of nonintervention, despite bilateral retalia-
tion through economic sanctions. Beginning immediately after the Cuba
Revolution, ousting Fidel Castro was discussed and supported within the
U.S. government, but it sought regime change only covertly. Public commu-
nications emphasized that sanctions sought to punish Cuba for expropriating
the property of U.S. nationals and to coerce the island into settling expropri-
ation claims. Disingenuously, U.S. policy purported to be based on bilateral
retaliation, justified on a country's sovereign right to decide its trade policy.
During this period, Cuba laid down the structural foundations of its com-
mand economy and socialist state.
In the second period, regime change continued as a covert objective,
but this time masked by a formal policy of Cold War containment. After
early U.S efforts to oust Fidel Castro failed and the Soviet Union became
Cuba's Great Power patron, the United States subsumed its policy on Cuba
as part of the Cold War. The rationale for sanctions became limiting the
spread of Cuban-style ideology and socialism to Latin America and else-
where. Efforts to oust the Cuban government continued through covert ter-
rorism sponsored by the Central Intelligence Agency. During this period,
Cuba's most important export and import markets were the Soviet Union and
its economic satellites, whose terms of trade guaranteed Cuba an important
subsidy.
Only during the third period (beginning in the 1990s) did ousting the
Cuban government become an explicit aim of U.S. foreign policy. When the
Cold War ended, sanctions on Cuba entered an age of integrity because Con-
gress declared statutorily that regime change was a central goal of U.S. pol-
icy. Putative codification by Congress in the 1990s dramatically extended
the extraterritorial reach of U.S. sanctions and made regime change a central
rather than collateral goal.
To put these questions about sovereignty, regime change, and liability
in context, this Article proceeds in three major parts before concluding. Part
II examines two separate but linked historical processes that developed in
tandem - Cuba's construction of a domestic socialist economy and the im-
position by the United States of economic sanctions on the island. During
the past half-century, Cuba has built and maintained a command economy
based on socialist principles. Post-Revolutionary Cuba enjoyed its most
prosperous years as an economic satellite of the Soviet Union, but the de-
mise of the Soviet Council for Mutual Economic Assistance stranded the
island in a regional economy that was remaking itself along the neoliberal
axioms of the Washington Consensus.3 4 Meanwhile, the United States ex-
"During the Reagan administration, economist John Williamson put together the ne-
oliberal axioms that came to be known as the Washington consensus, an insightful package of
policy goals designed to grow the economies in Latin America. These goals included increas-
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perimented with different ways of pursuing regime change, pursuing it pri-
marily as a covert policy until the 1990s. How these two processes -
Cuba's economic planning and the sanctions policy of the United States -
unfolded sets the stage for resolving the question of liability.
Part III examines how Cuba has presented its claim against the United
States at the United Nations and in Cuba. Every year, Cuba prepares a com-
prehensive report to the United Nations itemizing the harms caused by U.S.
policy. The report critically analyzes the legal structure of U.S. sanctions
and provides a compelling account of how these sanctions constrain the
state's ability to provide a social safety net, increase the cost of imports, limit
the island's export markets, and, generally, worsen the standard of living on
the island. In 1999, a Cuban court heard two legal actions against the United
States - one for liability arising from state-sponsored terrorism and a sepa-
rate one for liability caused by economic sanctions.35 These actions set out
the legal frame for Cuba's claim against the United States and provide a
granular history of U.S. sanctions and their impact on Cuba. Read together,
these U.N. reports and the lawsuits provide the legal and economic argu-
ments that make up Cuba's claim against the United States.
Part IV takes up several necessary but unsettled legal questions about
the notion of sovereignty raised by Cuba's claim. Public international law
does recognize that a country can promote regime change in another country
to protect human rights, but U.S. sanctions - as designed and implemented
- do not conform to this extraordinary and limited exception to the general
mandate of sovereignty. To prevail, Cuba must show that U.S. sanctions
proximately harmed the island's economy, no mean feat given that Cuba -
exercising its sovereign prerogatives - has pursued economic planning pol-
icies of questionable value for certain sectors. The Cuban reports and law-
suits concede little on this front, but doing so results in a more balanced
argument. After all, these sanctions violate the principle of nonintervention
in another country's affairs. These sanctions also depart from international
norms on economic aggression that seek to respect the sovereignty of other
countries, protect civilians from harm, and limit the extraterritorial reach of
any particular country's actions.
Settling the political risk between Cuba and United States requires find-
ing a forum whose jurisdiction both countries recognize, a difficult task
given the geopolitical distance between them. The unique circumstances of
U.S. sanctions and the Cuban economy raise important questions about how
to value damages to the economy and how to model economic causation.
ing fiscal discipline, reordering priorities for public expenditures, changing the tax system,
managing interest and exchange rates, liberalizing trade and foreign investment, privatizing
public sector businesses, promoting deregulation, and enhancing property rights. See John Wil-
liamson, Senior Fellow, Peterson Inst. for Int'l Econ., Speech at the Center for Strategic &
International Studies: Did the Washington Consensus Fail? (Nov. 6, 2002), available at https://
piie.com/commentary/speeches-papers/did-washington-consensus-fail, archived at https://per
ma.cc/9Y8S-F679 (analyzing why neoliberal policy reforms did not work as expected in Latin
America).
" See Security Complaint, supra note 20; Economic Complaint, supra note 21.
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Finally, fashioning an appropriate remedy requires taking into account how
the structure of international trade has changed since sanctions were first
imposed. Part V concludes with some observations on what resolution of
this dispute between Cuba and the United States means, not only for the two
countries but also for Cuban-Americans, Cubans in diaspora and those who
remain on the island.
The first word on these questions rather than the last, this Article offers
thinking tools for international law, macroeconomics, global trade, and
United States-Cuba relations. First, the Article analyzes how the United
States steadily (and unsuccessfully) tried to subvert the Cuban government
through three different policy frameworks - covertly through bilateral re-
taliation, covertly through Cold War containment, and, finally, overtly
through a formal policy of regime change. In so doing, it holds a mirror to
structural features of U.S. policy for Latin America less apparent in coun-
tries that succumb to rather than resist U.S. influence. Second, the Article is
a case history of an economy - Cuba's - that has resisted the shift towards
neoliberalism, deregulation, and globalization. Indeed, as part of Cuba's re-
cent economic reforms, the Cuban Communist Party affirmed its overriding
commitment to socialism, making the island holdout a counterpoint to a
world economy that has capitulated to capitalism. Its economic history
makes Cuba a fascinating laboratory for those interested in economics, par-
ticularly debates about the role of the state in regulating market institutions. 3 6
Third, the Article examines the difficulty of proving proximate causation for
macroeconomic harms that are always already overdetermined by separate
causes, some due to state action (itself a contestable notion) and others a
result of market movements. As national economies have become more
globalized, countries and firms encounter each other more frequently as a
routine business matter. This form of economic interdependence calls for
new ways to think about duty, injury, liability, and remedies, themes that
resonate in the story of the Cuban economy.
Finally, the Article puts Cuba's claim and its potential resolution in the
context of evolving notions of Cuban and Cuban-American identities. U.S.
certified property claims, Cuba's claims against the United States, Cuban-
American communities, and Cuban identity all emanate from the same geo-
political Big Bang - one country's revolution and another country's re-
sponse. Taking into account these different ethnic perspectives on the Cuban
nation helps to transcend the tired binaries that have kept these disputes fro-
zen for half a century.
36 The island's seeming reinsertion into the new international economy is also an opportu-
nity to reflect on how the neoliberal market has worked. Though heralded as a tool of develop-
ment, value chains also involve inequality between countries, expressed this time in terms of
access to the chain and the relative contribution or extraction of value from the chain. The
island conserves statist values and command practices that most of the rest of the world aban-
doned decades ago. As it reengages with the market economy, Cuba is sure to change; but so
too should market societies consider potential changes.
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II. ECONOMIC AND POLICY ANTECEDENTS
Resolving the current contention about U.S. liability means starting
with the early layers of this sedimentary history. U.S. interest in controlling
Cuba predated the Revolution, but the ensuing relationship between the two
countries provides a valuable record of this interest.37 The following discus-
sion identifies four major phases in the history of these sanctions. During
the first phase, Cuba's government began reconfiguring the island's econ-
omy, society, and legal institutions along socialist lines. As Cuba's first iter-
ation of a socialist economy took form, so too did U.S. sanctions. When this
process began, President Eisenhower first imposed sanctions, ostensibly to
express the disapproval of the United States for actions taken by the govern-
ment. Soon, however, the main rationale for sanctions changed, as President
Kennedy expanded these sanctions and subsumed them into the more gen-
eral Cold War framework. During this period, Cuba shifted its economy to-
wards the Soviet Union and its satellites, who coordinated their trade
policies through the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
("COMECON").
After the Soviet Union and its trading system collapsed in the early
1990s, Cuba entered the periodo especial, a difficult period of austerity and
structural adjustment to the loss of its most important counterparties. Con-
vinced that these economic hardships would make the Cuban government
vulnerable to collapse, the United States ramped up its sanctions against
Cuba (and against third parties who traded with Cuba). During this period,
the U.S. Congress tried to displace the Executive branch as the locus of
discretion over Cuba sanctions. The history of the present begins with Raul
Castro replacing his brother, Fidel Castro. This period has seen a substantial
number of economic reforms and the resumption of diplomatic relations be-
tween the two countries.
A. First Moves: The Construction of Socialist Economy and
Bilateral Retaliation
After Cuba won its independence from Spain in 1898, the United States
became increasingly active in the island's economy.3 8 As a condition of end-
ing its first occupation of Cuba (1898-1901), the United States required
Cuba to adopt changes to its Constitution authorizing interventions to secure
3 See EMBARGO o BLoQufo, supra note 26, at 118-29 (analyzing conceptual and legal
developments in U.S. foreign policy that served as precursors to U.S. sanctions on Cuba). The
instinct to determine the government in Cuba predated the Cuban Revolution. The U.S. reso-
lution on Cuba of 1902 makes clear its interest in the island. The Roosevelt Corollary to the
Monroe Doctrine asserted that the U.S. had an international police power that justified its
intervening throughout the Western Hemisphere. The Platt Amendment to the Cuban Consti-
tution refined this goal by making explicit that the U.S. could intervene in Cuba's internal
affairs to protect U.S. security or commercial interests. Id.
3 Cuban Claims, supra note 22, at 97-98.
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U.S. interests on the island, including commercial interests. In 1903, the two
countries signed three treaties that formalized the neocolonial structure of
their relations: the Permanent Treaty enacted the terms of the Platt Amend-
ment; the Reciprocity Treaty gave each country's goods preferential access
as imports; and the Lease Agreements gave the United States access to
Guantanamo and other Cuban territory." Under the authority of the Platt
Amendment, the United States occupied the island a second time from
1906-1 909.40
By 1909, the U.S. market absorbed over 87% of Cuban exports.4 1 The
Cuban sugar industry in particular benefitted from favored access to the
United States. During the first five years of the Reciprocity Treaty, sugar
exports to the United States increased over 35%.42 As trade between Cuba
and the United States grew, the island enjoyed economic growth and pros-
perity, although the economy depended heavily on a single export -
sugar.43 When the world price for sugar dropped precipitously in 1920, the
island entered a financial crisis, revealing the risk of overdependence on a
single export.
As a satellite market of its neighbor to the north, the Cuban economy
became a dependent variable of economic interests in the United States. Di-
versifying its agricultural production would reduce the Cuban economy's ex-
posure to cyclical downturns in commodity prices. Because rice was such a
staple of the Cuban diet, it made sense to increase the production of rice,
thereby increasing the island's self-sufficiency for that product, creating new
jobs, and reducing rice imports.44 In the decades leading up to the Revolu-
tion, however, pursuing diversification became hostage to the island's eco-
nomic dependency on the United States. The issue came to a head as the
island's successful diversification by promoting rice production led to back-
lash from the U.S.
It was a conflict between the political interests underlying two compet-
ing export markets. 45 Cuba's sugar industry relied on ongoing demand from
the U.S. market, which absorbed the lion's share of sugar exports. At the
same time, Cuba was also the largest consumer of U.S. rice exports. Indeed,
U.S. rice exporters needed the Cuban market as much as Cuban sugar ex-
porters needed the U.S. market. In the 1950s, the Cuban government began
to encourage rice production through subsidies and low-interest loans. As
" EmILo RoIG DE LEUCHSENRING, HisToRIA DE LA ENMIENDA PLArr 273-302 (1973).
40 Id.
41 INSTITUTO DE HISTORIA DE CUBA, LA NEOCOLONIA: ORGANIZACION Y CRIsis DESDE
1899-1940, at 153-54 (2002).
42 Id.
43 MARTHA PON, BREVE HiSTORIA DE CUBA 42-43 (2010).
" See Louis Pdrez, Univ. of N.C., Chapel Hill, "Sin azdcar no hay pafs:" Rethinking the
Political-Economy of Hegemony, panel presentation at the Eleventh Conference on Cuban and
Cuban-American Studies at Florida International University, (Feb. 24, 2017). In the 1950s,
annually Cubans consumed 137 pounds of rice compared with six pounds by those in the
United States. Id.
45 Id
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rice production grew, U.S. rice growers perceived the risk of losing their
largest export market. Through their representatives in Congress, the rice
interests threatened to end the preferential access of Cuban sugar into the
United States.46 The U.S. and sugar lobby responded by protecting their
preferential access.47 In the end, the Cuban government abandoned its suc-
cessful efforts to diversify through rice production.
As primarily a single-export country, Cuba would remain exposed to
the cyclical commodity risk of sugar. Nevertheless, between the two World
Wars Cuba experienced economic growth that created a new Cuban en-
trepreneurial class, one that would eventually threaten U.S. influence over
the island's economy. 48 In the years immediately before the Revolution, the
Cuban economy suffered from major weaknesses and a low standard of liv-
ing for most residents. Between 1950 and 1958, much financial capital left
the island through repatriation of profits earned by foreign investors - espe-
cially from the United States - and through other outflows, causing a large
deficit in the capital account of the balance of payments. 49 During this same
period, Cuba foreign reserves shrank by more than 80%, from $510 million
to less than $85 million.50 While many who lived in Cuba's cities enjoyed a
middle class standard of living, a large segment of the population lived in
poverty in rural areas."
Building a command economy started with a series of nationalizations
that concentrated economic power in the government, displaced foreign con-
trol over key sectors like sugar and oil, and created new governance institu-
tions to make and implement economic policy to further the socialist model.
As part of the Agrarian Reform in May 1959, the government nationalized
rural property, some of it owned by U.S. investors.5 2 This incident became
one of the first overt examples of growing animosity between the govern-
ments of Cuba and the United States.
Recognizing that dependency on sugar left the economy vulnerable to
economic instability, government planning in the early 1960s also promoted
industrialization and diversification into other agricultural goods, thereby in-
creasing self-sufficiency and - it was hoped - curbing the island's need
46 In a similar vein, several decades later President Eisenhower would kick off trade hos-
tilities with Cuba by threatening to reduce the sugar quota. See BACK CHANNEL, supra note 30,
at 22.
4 Insofar as U.S. interests controlled sugar production in Cuba, the conflict was between
U.S. rice growers and U.S. investors in Cuban sugar production. Id.
4 Louis NREZ, CUBA UNDER THE PLAF AMENDMENT 1902-1934, at 230-32 (University
of Pittsburgh ed., 1986).
49 BANCO NACIONAL DE CUBA, LA ECONOMfA CUBANA DURANTE EL PERIODo ESPECIAL
1990-2000, at 2 (2001).50 Id.
51 Id. at 3.
52 FRANCISCo E. GARCfA HENRiQUEZ, YARELIS MARTINEZ LORENZO, AND JHOSVANY MAR-
TiNEZ BARREIRO, COMPENDIO DE DisPosICIONEs LEGALES SOBRE NACIONALIZAClIN Y CONFIS-
CAC16N 25-28 (2004) (listing Cuban statutes, resolutions, and agreements regarding post-
Revolutionary nationalizations).
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for imports. 3 After these policies failed, the government restored the eco-
nomic focus on sugar, illustrated in 1970 by a national campaign to produce
a ten-million-ton harvest.r
In 1961, the Revolutionary government began to de-dollarize the Cuban
economy, starting with an exchange of pre-Revolutionary pesos for new cur-
rency. Informal dollar markets developed and the Cuban government main-
tained dollar reserves, but the dollar ceased serving as legal tender and
private dollar holdings were penalized. State enterprises emerged to absorb
many of the businesses that were nationalized, but the new state system
could not replace the foregone private sector, including a network of more
than 3,700 urban street vendors that had contributed to the island's distribu-
tion network for food.5 5
In addition to these economic reforms, several important social forma-
tions emerged during this period to consolidate the elite and to mobilize
masses as part of an emerging institutional arrangement. By 1965, the Cu-
ban Communist Party (including its Central Committee), Committees for the
Defense of the Revolution, militias, and the Federation of Cuban Women
had already emerged as structural elements in Cuban society. 56
In 1960, refineries owned by U.S. commercial interests (Texaco, Esso,
and Shell) refused to process Soviet crude oil at the suggestion of the United
States." Citing a 1938 Cuban law requiring refineries to process state, Cuba
nationalized these refineries.58 Ostensibly because of the failure to agree to
compensation for expropriated property of U.S. nationals, then-President
Dwight D. Eisenhower announced on July 6, 1960 that the U.S. would not
buy that year's allocated quota of Cuban sugar." In response, Cuba national-
ized all property of U.S. companies and citizens.
Later that year, Eisenhower imposed a partial trade embargo on Cuba
that exempted exports to the island of food, medicines, and medical sup-
plies.60 The initial stated goal of these sanctions was retaliation for Cuba's
nationalization of property owned by U.S. companies and individuals. At
the time, Eisenhower identified three rationales for the first sanctions: (i)
strict nonintervention in the island's domestic affairs; (ii) recognition of the
Cuban government's right to make internal reforms, consistent with interna-
tional law; and (iii) resolution of disputes in which Cuba had abridged the
rights of U.S. citizens.6 ' In this account, sanctions sought to prod Cuba to
offer settlement terms that were more acceptable to the U.S. government. In
" Louis A. PEREZ, JR., CUBA BETWEEN REFORM AND REVOLUTION 337-38 (1988).
54 Id. at 338-40. At 8,500,000 tons, the 1970 harvest fell short of the goal, though it did
set a new record for the island. Id.
55 Id.
56 MARIFEL PEREZ-STABLE, THE CUBAN REVOLUTION, ORIGINS, COURSE, AND LEGACY 99
(2d ed. 1999).
5 BACK CHANNEL, supra note 30, at 36-37.
Economic Complaint, supra note 21, at 4.
BACK CHANNEL, supra note 30, at 36-37.
e 
Id.
61 Osieja, supra note 27, at 36-37.
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1961, President Eisenhower placed Cuba under export controls contained in
the Export Control Act of 1949.62
During this period, both Cuba and the United States exercised sover-
eign prerogatives with relative freedom. Cuba conducted several expropria-
tion programs. The United States first imposed sanctions to express
disapproval of the Cuban government by interfering with a discrete and lim-
ited aspect of the economic relationship between the two countries. Granted,
suspending the sugar quota in 1960 might have foreseeably caused harm to
civilians, but any such harm was an unintended collateral harm of the policy.
Nevertheless, the U.S. government also experimented with other poli-
cies that presaged the radicalization of regime change, including the extrater-
ritoriality that would become a signature feature of U.S. sanctions in the
1990s. In October 1959, President Eisenhower approved a program of cov-
ert action by the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency to
promote political subversion on the island.63 As early as November 1959,
the United States exercised pressure on Great Britain and other countries to
stop selling armaments to Cuba.6 In March 1960, President Eisenhower
approved a proposal by the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") to pursue
destabilization of the Cuban government. 65 In September 1960, the State De-
partment drafted a paper outlining an economic strategy to oust Fidel Cas-
tro. 66 Relations between the two countries deteriorated further, reaching a
low when President Eisenhower broke diplomatic relations with the island
on January 3, 1961.67 The following year, the U.S. government began pursu-
ing Project Cuba, a comprehensive plan designed by the CIA to oust the
Cuban government.68
The United States also started trying to exclude Cuba from multilateral
organizations. In 1962, U.S. officials secured the suspension Cuba from the
Organization of American States and the Inter-American Bank for recon-
struction and development, entities in which Cuba wanted to remain. 69 In
general, post-Revolutionary Cuba sought an active role on the multilateral
stage, including in UNCTAD. By remaining part of the GATT, Cuba was
later able to join the World Trade Organization. Cuba's withdrawal from the
International Monetary Fund and International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development is a prominent exception to its general policy of strong multi-
lateral engagement.70
62 BACK CHANNEL, supra note 30, at 36-37.
6 Economic Complaint, supra note 21, Art. 1, at 2.
6 See EMBARGO o BLOQUd0, supra note 26, at 329; Economic Complaint, supra note 21,
Art.11, at 15.
61 Security Complaint, supra note 20, Art. 11, at 14.
' Osieja, supra note 27, at 38-39.
6' BACK CHANNEL, supra note 30, at 38.
' Security Complaint, supra note 20, Art. 8, at 23-24.
6 Economic Complaint, supra note 21, at 6.
'
0 Id. at 7.
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B. Taking Sides: Cold War Containment and the Sovietization of the
Cuban Economy
By the early 1960s, the island's economy reflected the impact of having
lost access to U.S. markets. Consider the change in the terms of trade be-
tween the two countries. In the decade before the Cuban Revolution, the
United States was Cuba's chief trading partner for both exports and imports:
on average, Cuba got 75% of its imports from the United States and placed
more than 60% of its exports there. 71 After two years of sanctions, Cuba had
redirected its trade to the Soviet Union and its trading allies, which ac-
counted for 76% of its exports.72
In part a response to the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of West-
ern Europe after World War II, the Soviet Union organized the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance ("COMECON"), an alternative economic
group that would come to include several Eastern European countries, in-
cluding Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and
East Germany. 73 COMECON sought to coordinate economic planning and
foreign trade between these countries. Cuba joined the group in 1972.
This trading system would be Cuba's most important market for exports
and imports until the dissolution of the Soviet trading block in the 1990s.
During the previous sixty years, nearly all of the machinery and supplies
used in Cuban industries had come from the U.S.; as the island lost access to
supplies and spare parts, production and transportation began to break
down. 74 The island began adapting its infrastructure to new trading partners,
but this led to losses, shortages, and delays as ports, warehouses, and trans-
portation networks were adapted to trade with China, eastern bloc countries,
and other substitute markets. 75 Trade with the Soviet Union and other social-
ist countries began to increase during this period as the island sought substi-
tute markets for the U.S.76 In addition to buying Cuban exports and
providing imports, the Soviet Union also provided technical assistance to
help the island build its expertise in a variety of sectors. 77
The island's entry into COMECON in 1972 further institutionalized the
adoption of Soviet economic models. 8 Most of the trade dislocation caused
by the loss of U.S. imports and the U.S. markets for Cuban exports took
place through Cuba's participation in the COMECON. During this period,
" Osieja, supra note 27, at 30-31.
72 Id. at 74.
" PEREZ, JR., supra note 53, at 378.
74 PEREZ, JR., supra note 53, at 346-47.
7 Id. at 347.
76 Id. 355.
77 Id. at 356.
7 At the beginning, Cuban socialism differed from the Soviet model, which favored a
more incremental and conservative approach to spreading socialism. Nevertheless, during this
period Cubans began to study the Soviet Union's approach to ideology, markets, and state
structure. See, e.g., P.N. FEDOSEEV ET AL., COMUNISMO CIENTIFICO (1989) (developing a
Marxist-Leninist analysis of capitalism, socialism, and revolutionary change).
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the Soviet Union supported the economy by letting Cuba import Soviet
goods on credit, and letting the island accumulate a debt estimated at 15
million rubles (roughly $23 billion in 1990 dollars). 9 More importantly, the
terms of trade gave Cuba a substantial subsidy. The Soviet Union paid Cuba
a premium over the world price for sugar and nickel exports while letting the
island buy oil at a discount over market prices. 0 The subsidy consisted of
the spread between these two prices.
Not only did Cuba capture this spread on its own products, it also in-
creased its subsidized trade with the Soviet Union using foreign products
priced at open market levels. Cuba bought sugar at market prices from other
countries and sold this imported sugar to the Soviet Union at the premium
price. Similarly, Cuba exported oil products that it had obtained from the
Soviet Union at a discount. Cuba earned hard currency on its oil reexports,
but the Soviet Union settled its trade with Cuba with nonconvertible rubles
that could be used to pay for Soviet goods but which could not be used
generally with other countries."' Sovietization spread from the economic
sphere to the political one in 1976, when Cuba adopted a new Constitution
based in large measure on the Soviet Constitution of 1936.82
This period of relative prosperity also saw Cuba play a leadership role
in the developing world, much of which viewed Fidel Castro as a hero. In
particular, Castro played a globally prominent role in calling for forgiveness
of the foreign debt incurred by many developing countries, in particular
through Cuba's participation as a leader within the Group of 77.83 Given its
size and resources, Cuba played an outsized role in multilateral policy.
These shifts Sovietized the standard of living for average Cubans."
U.S. products that had long been a mainstay of daily life disappeared from
the shelves, to be replaced with different products from the Soviet Union,
China, and COMECON members. The trading restrictions severely im-
pacted the healthcare sector. Before the Revolution, the U.S. provided the
lion's share of imported medicines. The island had its first post-Revolution-
ary trade surplus in 1974.85 Benefitted by high sugar crisis and cheap credit,
the island experienced its greatest post-Revolutionary growth and prosperity
between 1981-1985.86 Indeed, Cuba was one of only two Latin American
countries that ended the 1980s with a higher per capita income than in the
79 A. R. M. Ritter, The Cuban Economy in the 1990s: External Challenges and Policy
Imperatives, 32 J. lrENiRAM. STUo. & WORLD AFF. 117, 124-27 (1990).80 Id. at 128-3 1.
1 Id. at 129.
82 LEONEL DE LA CUESTA, CONSTITUCIONE.S CUBANAS 136-40 (2007).
83 See, e.g., FIDEL CASTRO, LA CANCELACI6N DE LA DEUDA EXTERNA Y EL NUEVO
ORDEN EcoNOMico INTrERNACIONAL COMO UNICA ALTERNATIVA (1985).
" The Cuban exile community followed these developments on the island and generated
an off-shore literature critical of these economic developments. See, e.g., Luis CONTE,
AGUERO, DoCTRINA DE LA CONTRA INTERVENCION: SOVIETIZACI6N DE LA EcONOMiA CUBANA
(1962) (elaborating on economic critique of Cuban government).
5 PEREZ, JR., supra note 53, at 354.
8 6 CINCUENTA ArOS DE LA EcoNoMIA CUBANA 1-24, 12 (Omar Everleny Prez Vil-
lanueva ed., 2010).
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preceding decade. 7 Along with other Latin American countries, though,
Cuba also became heavily indebted to external creditors. While the Brady
Plan helped other countries to restructure their debt with the support of the
U.S. Treasury, Cuba did not participate. In 1986, Cuba defaulted on its
roughly $8 billion in foreign debt to public and private creditors."
Before the Revolution, Cuba's trade with China and COMECON coun-
tries amounted to 2.2% of its gross trade; by 1967, this figure had risen to
over 79%.89 Substituting less convenient markets for the U.S. increased
shipping costs. 90 For example, before the Revolution, Cuba paid $1.10 per
metric ton for oil from Venezuela. This price increased more than five-fold
to $6.50 when the Soviet Union became the island's chief trading partner.'
Also, the size of shipments increased, which meant building larger ware-
houses to hold larger volumes of goods. The cost of trade also increased
because U.S. sanctions prohibited Cuba's use of the dollar and limited its
access to credit. Often, Cuba had to prepay purchases using confirmed let-
ters of credit, which increased financing costs. 9 2
As it became clear that the Cuban Revolution would persist, the policy
goals of the United States shifted. By the time of President Johnson, the
administration concluded that Fidel Castro had consolidated his power such
that regime change as previously imagined was unlikely. 93 Contemporane-
ous State Department documents that emphasize the need to isolate (rather
than only destabilize Cuba) confirm this important policy shift.94 In particu-
lar, the United States sought to contain the spread of Cuba's ideology and
influence in Latin America and Africa.
Under the logic of the Cold War, the United States expressed its ani-
mosity towards the Soviet Union diplomatically but avoided armed conflict.
In effect, this involved bipolar hegemony in which the United States and the
Soviet Union split global dominance between a capitalist West and a social-
ist East. In 1962, President John F. Kennedy imposed a more comprehen-
sive trade embargo on the island.95 Retaliation for unsettled claims remained
a goal, but Cuba sanctions were subsumed into the Cold War program of
export controls already imposed on the Soviet Union.9 6 Its goal, he said, was
" Colombia was the other country. THE CUBAN ECONOMY AT THE START OF THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY XVii (Jorge 1. Dominguez et al. eds., 2004).
8 CINCUENTA A&IOS DE LA ECONOMIA CUBANA, supra note 86, at 13.
8 Osieja, supra note 27, at 76.
0 Id. at 75.
91 Id. at 76.
92
93 See BUREAU OF PUB. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 11173, FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964-1968, VOLUME XXXII: DOMINICAN REPUBLIC; CUBA;
HAITI; GUYANA 620 (2005), available at https://s3.amazonaws.com/static.history.state.gov/
frus/frusl964-68v32/pdf/frusl964-68v32.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/5BU9-SVGY (de-
scribing George Ball's speech before the North Atlantic Council on March 23, 1964).
' U.S. DEP'F OF STATE, NTER-AMERICAN SERIES 88, PUB. No. 7690, U.S. POLICY To-
WARDS CUBA (1964) (emphasizing risks of Communist contagion, particularly in Latin
America).
* Proclamation No. 3447, 27 Fed. Reg. 1085 (Feb. 7, 1962).
Osieja, supra note 27, at 24.
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to promote "security by isolating the present Government of Cuba
and. . .reducing the threat posed by . . . alignment with the communist
powers.""7
The major structural elements of U.S. sanctions on Cuba took shape
during this period, which spans from John F. Kennedy to George W. Bush.
The President delegated his statutory authority (then derived primarily from
the Trading With the Enemy Act) to the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets
Control ("OFAC"), which became the seat of the Cuban embargo.98 In
1962, the Treasury issued the Cuban Import Regulations, which banned all
imports from the island.99 The following year, the Treasury issued a more
extensive body of regulations, the first iteration of the Cuban Assets Control
Regulations ("CACR").'" Codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 515, the CACR remain
the principal source of embargo relations, though they have been amended
many times.' 0 '
These regulations establish the boundary of permitted contact with the
island by prohibiting a variety of Cuba-related transactions and generally
licensing certain activities, including humanitarian projects, certain aca-
demic activities, and family visits."0 OFAC can also grant special licenses
for activity not otherwise covered by the general licenses.1 03 OFAC rulemak-
ing is subject to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).'0 The Department
of Commerce imposed its own limits on trade with Cuba, in particular in-
volving requiring licenses for exports or imports between the two
countries.105
" Proclamation No. 3447, 27 Fed. Reg. 1085 (Feb. 7, 1962).
* Like other Treasury departments, OFAC is headed by a political appointee and staffed
with lawyers, economists, and other professionals who are civil servants.
' Amendment of Foreign Asset Control Regulations, 27 Fed. Reg. 1116 (Feb. 7, 1962) (to
be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 500).
I Amendment to Cuban Import Regulations, 27 Fed. Reg. 2765-2766 (March 24, 1962)
(to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 515).
'o' Certain activities, importing and exporting for example, are banned outright. Travel by
individuals is not prohibited outright. Instead, the regulations generally financial transactions
that are a necessary part of travel to Cuba. The regulations also grant general licenses that do
not require prior approval and authorize additional licenses granted at the discretion of the
Office of Foreign Assets Control, a unit of the U.S. Treasury.
02 See generally, STAFF OF H. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 109TH CONG., OVERVIEW
AND COMPILATION OF U.S. TRADE STATUTE PART I OF II (Comm. Print 2005), available at
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-11 1WPRT63130/pdf/CPRT-111 WPRT63130.pdf,
archived at https://perma.cc/G6N6-W4D7; U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUnSTIONS RELATED TO CUBA (Jan. 6, 2017), available at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/cuba-faqs new.pdf, archived at https://perma.cclUJ3Q-
LANT.
103 Id.
" A coalition of parties unsuccessfully challenged the Constitutionality of OFAC's limits
on academic travel as well as the propriety of these rules under the APA. See Emergency Coal.
to Defend Educ. Travel v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, 545 F.3d 4, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (affirming
dismissal of claims brought under the Constitution and APA).
' See Export Administration Act of 1979 § 4; 50 U.S.C. § 4603 (2012); Exec. Order No.
12,002, 42 Fed. Reg. 35,623'(July 7, 1977) (delegating authority under the Export Administra-
tion Act, including issuing export and import licenses, to the Secretary of Commerce).
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The basic licensing framework has remained constant, but the scope of
allowable activity has changed with the vagaries of executive policy. For
example, the scope of permitted sales of food and medicine changed fre-
quently during this period. The licensing of family remittances and travel
has also undergone important shift. In 1975, foreign subsidiaries of U.S.
corporations were exempted from many of bans on commerce with Cuba,
although Congress would later restore these prohibitions.0 In 1977, the
U.S. and Cuba resumed limited diplomatic relationships by establishing in-
terest sections in the embassies of other countries.
Establishing remedies for those whose property had been expropriated
by the Cuban government was another critical aspect of institutionalizing
sanctions. Cuba's internal law governs the settlement of expropriation
claims of its citizens. The claims of foreigners, however, enjoy a different
legal status because they involve a dispute between two sovereigns: the ex-
propriating country and the other country whose citizens lose property. 07
Cuba settled its expropriation claims with Switzerland, France, the United
Kingdom, Spain, Mexico, and Italy, but not those asserted by the United
States with respect to its nationals.108 This is a decisive yet murky chapter in
U.S.-Cuba relations.'" It seems that the dispute turned on the standard used
to determine the value of the takings. Capital-importing countries - like
Cuba - and capital-exporting countries - like the United States - gener-
ally disagree on how to determine compensation for expropriation.' 10 Capi-
tal-exporting countries tend to insist on the Hull formula, which emphasizes
fair market value, even though it may result in foreigners being treated more
favorably than the expropriating country's citizens."' In contrast, capital-
importing countries prefer to treat foreigners and citizens equally, drawing
on the Calvo doctrine."l 2
Consequently, the U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission
("Claims Commission") established a Cuba program to consider the claims
to restitution of companies and individuals that were U.S. nationals at the
time of the expropriation." 3 With respect to these claims, the Claims Com-
mission conducted two Cuban Claims Programs, which have certified 5,913
'0 KENN-Im RODMAN, SANCTIONs BEYOND BoRDERs: MULTINATIONAL SANCTIONS AND
U.S. STATECRAFrT 115-116 (2001).
107 See Jos6 Gabilondo, Cuba: Cutting Property Claims Down to Size, HUFFINGTON POST
(Sep. 22, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jose-gabilondo/cuba-keeping-property-cla_b
8160264.html, archived at https://perma.cc/KM7U-588Q (putting certified claims in context of
political risk and property law).
" See EMBARGO o BLOQUtO, supra note 26, at 54-58.
'0 BACK CHANNEL, supra note 30, at 165-66.
1o See EMBARGO o BLOQUOo, supra note 26, at 74-103 (discussing how the Drago,
Calvo, Carranza, and Cirdenas doctrines relied on in Latin America resulted in equal treatment
of foreign and domestic investors).
11 Id.
112 Id.
"' See Cuba Claims Program Overview, FOREIGN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT COMM'N OF THE
U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. (Feb. 3, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/fcsc/claims-against-cuba, archived
at https://perma.cc/N2K8-WDPV.
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restitutionary claims with a market value - including interest - of about
$6-8 billion. U.S. corporations own less than a fifth of these claims, but
these are large dollar claims that represent about 85% of the face value of
the certified claims.11 4 Many corporate owners of these claims have no inter-
est in pursuing them; instead, these corporations would swap their claims for
commercial rights to conduct business in Cuba. The remaining 15% of
claims value is divided among roughly 5,000 individuals; of the 48 largest
claims, all but five belong to corporations." 5 The United States also has a
small creditor claim against Cuba arising from a loan by the U.S. Export-
Import Bank."'
The United States also tipped its hand on its previously covert attempts
to oust Fidel Castro. In 1961, the U.S. government worked with emigrated
Cubans to launch an armed invasion of the island in Playa Gir6n."' Though
unsuccessful, the incident made overt the interest of the United States in
destabilizing the Cuban government. As a formal matter, the U.S. govern-
ment respected Cuban sovereignty, but covert attempts to destabilize the
government continued.
C. Austerity and Regime Change
In 1991, the Soviet trading system dissolved after the political transfor-
mation of the Soviet Union. COMECON's break-up left Cuba in an eco-
nomically precarious position, styled as "the special period in times of
peace" (el perfodo especial). Bereft of former allies, facing a future with-
out the favorable funding spread from previous terms of trade, and forced to
find new sources of investment and commerce, Cuba took halting steps to
open its economy to foreign capital and market forces.
Under the guidance of Carlos Lage Divila as Vice President of the
Council of State, Cuba in the early 1990s undertook modest economic re-
forms. In 1992, Cuba amended its Constitution, to broaden notions of per-
sonal property and slightly reduce statist control over the economy."' In
1993, the government began to authorize self-employment in certain sec-
114 See generally RICHARD E. FEINBERG, BROOKINGS INST., RECONCILING U.S. PROPERTY
CLAIMS IN CUBA (2015), available at https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/
Reconciling-US-Property-Claims-in-Cuba-Feinberg.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/PCV7-
7WLT.
"' Rolando Anillo-Badia, Outstanding Claims to Expropriated Property in Cuba, in 21
Ass'N FOR THE STUDY OF THE CUBAN EcON., CUBA IN ThANSITION 83, 88 (2011), available at
http://www.ascecuba.org/c/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/v21-anillo.pdf, archived at https://
perma.cclUVJ8-93KC.
".. In addition to the claims certified by the U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission,
the United States has its own small creditor claim against Cuba in connection with credit
issued by the U.S. Export-Import Bank. See Jos6 Gabilondo, Sending the Right Signals: Using
Rent-Seeking Theory to Analyze the Cuban Central Bank, 27 Hous. J. INT'L L. 483, 506-07
(2005) [hereinafter Central Bank].
"1 BACK CHANNEL, supra note 30, at 42-43.
"1 CONSTITUCON DE LA REPUBLICA DE CUBA (1976).
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tors."9 That same year, small-scale agricultural markets and cooperatives
were authorized.1 20 During this period, the government also adopted a for-
eign investment law, decriminalized the use of the U.S. dollar, and estab-
lished a central bank - all adjustment strategies towards greater economic
freedom.12 ' Cuba also authorized free trade zones and industrial parks.1 22
The Cuban Central Bank also introduced a convertible peso, which is still
part of the island's complex monetary system.1 23 It is during this period that
tourism to Cuba grew, increasing six-fold between 1990 to 2000.124
Nevertheless, these modest reforms could not stop the economy's free
fall. Between 1989 and 1993, Cuba reduced its imports by almost 80% and
its gross domestic product shrank by nearly 35%. 125 An extensive literature
documents how people on the island suffered acutely during the special pe-
riod.1 26 For example, during this period, nutritional standards fell below the
minimum recommended by the United Nations Food and Agricultural Or-
ganization.1 27 By the mid 2000s, the worst of Cuba's structural adjustment
was over and the standard of living for average Cubans began to improve.
In time, Venezuela came to provide some of the economic support that the
Soviet Union had formerly provided.
The fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet Union
raised the hopes of Cuba's enemies because they assumed that the island
would now be more vulnerable to economic aggression. Other factors made
it more politically correct to take a hard line with Cuba. First, the neoliberal
"' See El Decreto-Ley No. 141 Sobre El Ejercicio del Tabajo por Cuenta Propia, 5 GAC.
OF. 11 (Cuba 1995).
120 See El Decreto-Ley No. 142 Sobre los Unidades Basicas de Produccion Cooperativa, 6
GAc. OF. 15 (Cuba 1995).
121 See El Decreto-Ley No. 192 De los Tratados Internacionales, 12 GAc. OF. 193 (Cuba
1999); El Decreto-Ley No. 192 De la Administracion Financiera del Estado, 20 GAC. OF. 323
(Cuba 1999); Central Bank, supra note 116, at 499-501.
122 See El Decreto-Ley No. 165 De las Zonas Francas y Parques Industriales, 26 GAc. OF.
410 (Cuba 1996).
"o In addition to having two domestic currencies - the national peso (CUP) and the con-
vertible peso (CUC) - Cuba has multiple CUP:CUC exchange rates, including market rates
determined by private activity and policy rates set by governmental fiat. In general, these
policy rates inflate the value of the CUP by accounting for intra-governmental transactions
with exchange rates as high as I CUC: 1 CUP. The distortions caused by these multiple rates
make it very difficult to determine the relative profitability of government ventures. Neither
the CUC nor the CUP trade off the island, hence Cuba has domestic money but nothing that
serves as money in international transactions. Rather than using explicit subsidies, taxes, and
tariffs to conduct industrial policy, Cuba uses varying CUC:CUP exchange rates to incentivize
different sectors of the economy. See Jos6 Gabilondo, What Happens When Cuba Devalues Its
Peso?, HUFF[NGTON POST (Sep. 15, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jose-gabilondo/
making-sense-of-todays-cuban-economy-promises-in-the-making-b-75 2 738 0.html1, archived
at https://perma.cc/Q9RA-ASWC.
124 CUBAN CENTRAL BANK, LA EcONOMiA CUBANA EN EL PERIODo ESPECIAL 1990-2000,
at 8 (Aug. 20, 2003), available at http://www.bc.gob.cu/Anteriores/Otros/economia%20cub
ana.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/TRT8-HUQU.
2- Id. at 7.
2 6 See, e.g., CRisIs, CAMBIOS EcON6Micos Y SUBJETIVIDAD DE LAS CUBANAS (Felix
Varela 2004) (analyzing impact of special period austerity on women).
127 Jorge 1. Domfnguez, Introductory Analysis, in THEs CUBAN EcONOMY AT THE START OF
nHE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 1, 4 (Jorge 1. Domfnguez et al. eds., 2004).
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revolution in the United States led by Ronald Reagan and movement con-
servatives provided moral clarity about the superiority of capitalism, justify-
ing sharp-elbowed treatment of socialist holdouts. Second, a maturing
Cuban-American political class learned to leverage their financial and politi-
cal clout to escalate hostilities against the island.
This escalation took two important forms. First, Congress tried to move
the locus of administrative discretion over these sanctions away from the
Executive by enacting statutes that "codified" the previous Presidential ac-
tions. Until the 1990s, the Cuban embargo grew through discretionary exec-
utive actions taken by U.S. presidents using statutory authorities. With some
exceptions, U.S. presidents and Congress had generally been aligned on the
need to maintain the economic embargo on Cuba.1 28 However, some in Con-
gress knew that this might one day change. Since virtually all of the prohibi-
tions in the Cuba sanctions flowed from regulations - which could be
rescinded by a president - conservatives in Congress sought to shift the
locus of political discretion over Cuba sanctions to itself.
To that end, Congress attempted to codify some of the executive pro-
nouncements and regulatory actions that had imposed sanctions on Cuba. In
1992, Congress adopted the Cuban Democracy Act ("CDA"), which im-
posed more restraints on trade between the two countries, including the re-
imposition of bans on foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies. 29 The CDA
also attempted to expand the extraterritorial reach of U.S. sanctions by ad-
vising (but not requiring) the President to cut off foreign financial assistance
to countries that helped Cuba.3 0 That same year, Cuba would succeed in
having the United Nations approve a motion condemning U.S. sanctions on
the island.
Four years later, Congress enacted the Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity Act of 1996 ("Helms-Burton"), which purported to codify the
embargo through federal statute."' Helms-Burton introduced a new wrinkle
into Cuba sanctions. By threatening to impose liability on foreign purchas-
ers of Cuban property subject to the potential claims of U.S. citizens, the
statute dramatically expanded the extraterritorial reach of U.S. foreign pol-
icy, raising the hackles of allies.
In response to the Helms-Burton Act, in 1996 Cuba adopted its own
claims program in Statute #80 (Reaffirmation of Cuban Dignity and Sover-
eignty). 3 2 This statute authorized natural people (not legal persons like cor-
porations) to bring claims against the U.S. for personal or property harms
128 For example, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger explored a possible d6tente with the
Cuban government in the 1970's, but President Richard Nixon put an end to the process. See
BACK CHANNEL, supra note 30, at 119-23.
129 Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-484, § 1706, 106 Stat. 2315 (1992).130 Id. § 1704.
'3 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) (Helms-Burton) Act of 1996,
Pub. L. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (1996). For a general overview of Helms-Burton, see generally
RICARDO ALARCON DE QUESADA, HELMs-BURTON: SLAVERY LAW (1997).
32 El Ley No. 80 Ley de Reafirmacion de la Dignidad y Soberama Cubanas, 2 GAC. OF.
299 (Cuba 1996).
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caused by U.S. actions since January 1, 1959.'13 The Cuban government has
yet to establish the formal program to file and adjudicate these claims, but
the legal authority is in place.
In a previous era, the Platt Amendment to the Cuban Constitution es-
tablished the prerequisites for the United States to end its first military occu-
pation of the island. 134 In a similar vein, Helms-Burton laid down the bright
line requirements that Cuba would have to meet in order for Congress to lift
the embargo. Chief among these requirements was settlement of the claims
certified by the U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission.3 5 The focus
on regime change later peaked during the administration of President George
W. Bush, who had the "unabashed aim of subverting the Cuban government
by economic strangulation."' 36 Going against this direction, in 2000 Con-
gress authorized limited agricultural exports to Cuba in the Trade Sanctions
Reform and Export Enhancement Act.13 7 In 2004, President George W.
Bush tightened restrictions on remittances and travel to the island by Cuban-
Americans visiting family.' 38
The second major way in which U.S. sanctions became more severe
was by making regime change on the island a central goal, rather than a de
facto one pursued surreptitiously while seeking plausible deniability. After
the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Cold
War ended, depriving Cuba hawks of the raison d'dtre for these policies.
The OFAC machinery kept running smoothly thanks to the cumulative con-
struction of these sanctions through six U.S. presidents (Eisenhower, Ken-
nedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter), but a new animating goal was
needed. In response, promoting regime change in Cuba became the formal
stated objective of U.S. foreign policy. As noted, influencing and - at
times - selecting Cuba's leaders had long figured in the U.S. foreign policy,
but officials had refrained from explicitly committing themselves to it.
Much like the 1959 Chevrolets still on the road in Cuba, OFAC's Cold War
machine could now be retooled to more explicitly destabilize the island.
Since 1996, the United States has spent over $260 million to promote
activities - including covert activities - on the island designed to
destabilize the incumbent government.' 39 The Government Accountability
Office has published several public reports finding mismanagement and ir-
regularities in the way that U.S.A.I.D has conducted some of its "democracy
"3 Id.
134 See Cuban Claims, supra note 22, at 96-99 (recounting history of the Platt Amend-
ment). The United States occupied Cuba a second time from 1906 to 1909. Id.
'3 See Helms-Burton § 204.
36 BACK CHANNEL, supra note 30, at 356.
1' Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, P.L. 106-387, § 908,
114 Stat 1549 (2000).
3. BACK CHANNEL, supra note 30, at 356.
`9 Editorial, In Cuba, Misadventures in Regime Change, N.Y. TEMES (Nov. 9, 2014),
available at https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/10/opinion/in-cuba-misadventures-in-regime-
change.html, archived at https://perma.cc/X43A-6DH3.
73
Harvard Latinx Law Review
promotion" programs in Cuba.'" In 2009, a U.S.A.I.D. contractor - Alan
Gross - repeatedly smuggled contraband communication equipment into
Cuba.141 It is not clear whether Gross was acting as an independent contra-
bandist or under the aegis of the federal agency, whose covert activities on
the island were implemented with plausible deniability.
D. Raul Castro, Economic Reforms, and Diplomatic Normalization
In 2008, Raul Castro became President as his brother Fidel entered the
final stage of his participation in Cuba. Beginning in 2011, the government
of Raul Castro began what is undeniably the period of most substantive re-
forms of the economy and, in general, Cuban society. Recognizing the need
to make structural changes to the former, the last two Congresses of the
Cuban Communist Party (the governing policy body) have affirmed a
blueprint of structural reforms designed to make the economy more
dynamic.1 42
Reforms have targeted the economy. In November 2011, Decree Law
287 abolished the Ministry of Sugar and replaced it with a holding company
with a streamlined organizational structure.1 43 That same month, the
purchase and sale of residential real estate became legal, kicking off the
property market. 1" Quickly thereafter, the island's banks were authorized to
make loans to small businesses and farmers.1 45 In 2012, the government
increased the amount of land that could be leased by farmers and made the
leases more transferable.14 On January 1, 2013, a new income tax took ef-
fect, with marginal rates from 15% to 50%.147 In 2015, Cuba reached an
agreement with its Paris Club creditors to reschedule the debt owed to offi-
'" A 2006 audit by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that "democracy
assistance" programs lacked internal controls, did not ensure that disbursed funds were spent
properly, and could not guarantee that recipients of funds complied with applicable laws and
regulations. GAO, REP. No. GAO-07-147, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE: U.S. DEMOCRACY Assis-
TANCE FOR CUBA NEEDs BETTER MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT 44 (2006). A follow up re-
port two years later noted some program improvements but found ongoing weaknesses in
internal controls and oversight of grantees. GAO, REP. No. GAO-09-165, FOREIGN Assis-
TANCE: CONTINUED EFFORTS NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN USAID's OVERSIGHT OF U.S. DEMoc-
RACY ASSISTANCE FOR CUBA 24 (2008). As recently as 2013, the GAO continued to find
shortcomings in these programs. GAO, GAO-13-285, CUBA DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE:
USAID's PROGRAM IS IMPROVED, BUT STATE COULD BETfER MONrYOR ITS IMPLEMENTING
PARTNERS 39-40 (2013).
141 See Editorial, supra note 139.
42 See generally CONGRESO PCC, CONCEPTUALIZACI6N DEL MODELO ECON6Mico v So-
CIAL CUBANO DE DESARROLLO SOCIALISTA (2016), available at http://www.granma.cu/file/
pdf/gaceta/Copia%20para%20el%20Sitio%2OWeb.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/R9CC-
KD99.
14 MARC FRANK, CUBAN REVELATIONS 265 (2013).
'" Id. at 257.
14 Id. at 264.
'" Id. at 263.
147 Id. at 268.
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cial creditors. 148 Other reforms have increased mass access to the internet,
improved relations with religious authorities, and made it easier for Cubans
to get passports and leave the island temporarily or for good.149 Indeed, re-
forming the island's monetary structure remains a high priority economic
reform.s0
The Party recognizes that these reforms have not come as quickly as
hoped.15' As part of the process, economists on the island - including offi-
cials who work at state agencies - have critically examined the island's
economic structure. A recent book by island economists encouraging re-
forms to promote innovation and productivity offers a nuanced account of
the structural problem with Cuba's economy. 152 While recognizing that U.S.
sanctions plays a decisive role in limiting economic development, the book
also considers other causes, including the lasting harms of having partici-
pated in COMECON. 5 1 It argues for policies to promote better participation
in global value chains.1 54 Increasing its exports is crucial to the island's
success. 15
Most recently, the island's economic problems have worsened because
Venezuela has had to cut back on (subsidized) trading with the island be-
cause of the declining price of oil and the reduced production of PDVSA, the
state oil company.' 6 In effect, Venezuela's own social problems have left it
unable to continue its previous role of white knight. As a result, the Cuban
government has imposed austerity measures including brown outs, black-
outs, and some price controls for basic foodstuffs.'
President Obama substantially changed sanctions. In April of 2009, he
rescinded limits on family travel and remittances to Cuba; he also authorized
U.S. telecommunications companies to enter the Cuban market.' 8 In 2011,
OFAC relaxed prohibitions on academic exchange and people-to-people
travel.15 9 After the two countries announced the imminent resumption of
48 How the island will resolve its outstanding debt to private creditors in the London Club
remains to be seen.
1' Those who claim that Raul Castro has changed little can say so only by assiduously
avoiding any contact with the island.
50 See Gabilondo, supra note 123 (analyzing implications to state balance sheets of
devaluation).
'' Nevertheless, I am bullish on the prospects for Cuba and its economy. See Jos6
Gabilondo, Reimagining Financial Capitalism: Promoting Socially-Responsible Investment in
Cuba, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 21, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jose-gabilondo/
reimagining-financial-capital-b8330120.html, archived at https://perma.cc/55TF-T9RE (ana-
lyzing latent investment markets in Cuba).
52 See Ileana Dfaz Femndez, La Competitividad en la Empresa Cubana, in CUBA: LA
RUTA NECESARIA DEL CAMBIO EcoNoMIco 122-142 (Omar E. Perez Villanueva & Ricardo
Torres Perez eds., 2013).
1
5 3 Id. at 127, 132.
'1 Id. at 127.
155 See generally Isis LILA MA14AL[CH, EXPORTAR PARA CRECER: UNA NECESIDAD IMPER-
ANTE EN LA EcONOWiA CUBANA (2014).
156 Id.
157 Id.
15 Id.
159 Id.
75
Harvard Latinx Law Review
diplomatic relations on December 14, 2014, the Obama administration began
rolling back long-standing regulatory limits on economic exchange and cul-
tural contact between the two countries.so In 2015, the State Department
removed Cuba from the list of countries that sponsor terrorism, an important
step towards normalization.1 61 That same year, however, President Obama
renewed the declaration of a state of emergency with Cuba under the Trading
with the Enemy Act, a decision that continued certain sanctions.1 62
On March 15, 2016, other substantial changes to the regulation took
place, including the announcement by OFAC that U.S. banks could open
accounts for Cuban nationals and that the Cuban government could use the
U.S. dollar in its international transactions. That same month, President
Obama became the first U.S. president to visit Cuba since Calvin Coo-
lidge.1 63 In October 2016, as part of several changes in sanctions policies the
Departments of Treasury and Commerce announced the lifting of bans in-
volving pharmaceuticals, humanitarian travel, and Cuban imports.1 61 These
changes have created a sense of momentum and possibility both on the is-
land, in Miami, and in the United States.165 Potential foreign investors, in
particular, remain interested in the Cuban market.'6
Ell. THE CUBAN VIEW
Cuba has long estimated the economic harm of U.S. sanctions. Part A
analyzes the island's annual report to the United Nations, which contains the
most economic analysis of these harms. The legal actions brought in a Cu-
6 The Obama administration also made other major changes to its Cuba policy in areas
other than trade and the economy. See MARK P. SULLIVAN, CONG. RES. SERV., R43024, CUBA:
U.S. POLICY AND ISSUES FOR THE 113TH CONGRESs 25-28 (2014). For example, on May 29,
2015, the Secretary of State removed Cuba from a list of countries with ties to terrorism, long
a bone of contention with the Cuban government. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, Rescis-
sion of Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (May 29, 2015). Since this Article focuses on
economic sanctions, I do not analyze the entirety of the relationship between the two countries.
161 Id.
162 Press Release, The White House, Notice - Continuation of the National Emergency
with Respect to Cuba (Feb. 25, 2015), available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-
press-office/2015/02/25/notice-continuation-national-emergency-respect-cuba, archived at
https://perma.cc/C62R-LTKQ.
163 Dan Roberts, Obama Lands in Cuba as First U.S. President to Visit un Nearly a Cen-
tury, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/20/ba
rack-obama-cuba-visit-us-politics-shift-public-opinion-diplomacy, archived at https://perma.cc
/2SRJ-8VUW.
" In total, the Obama administration made six different sets of changes to licensing
policy.
161 Jos6 Gabilondo, Voices: In Cuba, Economic Contradictions Amid Change, NBC NEWS
LATINO BLOG, (Aug. 21, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/voices-cuba-economic-
contradictions-amid-change-nl81616, archived at https://perma.cc/5SDT-A48L (discussing
economic changes on the island).
'" For a good general overview of legal issues faced by foreign investors see SINRELEX
DOMINICANA ABOGADOS CONSULTORES SRL's, FOREIGN INVESTMENr IN CUBA (2015).
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ban court in 1999 set out more of the legal framework for the claim.167 Part
B examines these two actions.
A. Claims Before the United Nations
In preparation for the annual vote on a United Nations resolution op-
posing sanctions, Cuba prepares a comprehensive report itemizing the harms
to its economy caused by U.S. sanctions. A scrupulously detailed account-
ing of interference with exports, imports, financing, and economic develop-
ment, it is the single best source for understanding Cuba's claims against the
United States. Focused on macroeconomics, trade, and development, the re-
port does not address the counterintelligence and covert operations analyzed
in the Security Complaint. The 2016 report has five major parts that review
the legal structure of U.S. sanctions, their impact on the Cuban economy, the
human rights and sovereign prerogatives harmed by these sanctions, and the
near universal opposition to these measures. The report does not say much
about the claim's legal theory, a theme developed more fully in the domestic
lawsuits.
The discussion starts with a detailed snapshot of the state of U.S. sanc-
tions between April 2015 and April 2016.168 The tenor here is mixed, prais-
ing the removal of Cuba from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism but
criticizing the President's decision to renew sanctions under the Trading With
the Enemy Act.' 69 The Obama administration broke with the past half-cen-
tury of U.S. foreign policy, but compared with the enormity of U.S. sanc-
tions these recent reforms represent marginal rather than structural advances.
The single most complete two pages on the issue, the report outlines the
current U.S. legal authority for Cuba sanctions.1 70 While conceding that stat-
utes limit the President's authority to end sanctions on the island, the report
asserts-as I have as well-that President Obama failed to exercise the full
measure of his discretion to normalize economic relations with the island.'7 1
The report starts with twenty-seven specific examples of failed transac-
tions which illustrate how (during the one year post-normalization interval
of the report) U.S. sanctions interfere with the ability of Cuba and its nation-
als to make international payments, arrange trade financing, receive wire
transfers, open and operate bank accounts, and settle trade obligations.1 72
Several of these examples relate to fines in excess of $100 million imposed
67 See generally Security Complaint, supra note 20; Economic Complaint, supra note 21.
is 2016 CUBA REPORT, supra note 17, at 1-12.
169 Id. at 1.
170 Id. at 2-5.
"' Id. at 6-7. Elsewhere, I have argued that because of these Constitutional defects in
Helms-Burton, the Presidency has more power to abolish the embargo than it has claimed to
date. Jos6 Gabilondo, Can Obama Unilaterally End the Cuba Embargo?, WORLD POST (Aug.
31, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jose-gabilondo/can-obama-end-longtime-cuba-em
bargo b_8059762.html, archived at https://perma.cc/4YHH-2BE8.
172 2016 CUBA REPORT, supra note 17, at 8-12.
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by OFAC on U.S. and foreign financial and commercial institutions.1 73
Other examples involve relatively minor transactions.1 74 During this report-
ing period, the United States imposed 61 separate sanctions on foreign
banks, which resulted in problems with issuing or confirming letters of
credit, setting up correspondent banking services, using SWIFT, and carry-
ing out foreign exchange transactions."'
In addition to the negative impact on financial transactions, the report
suggests three major kinds of harm resulting from U.S. sanctions. First,
sanctions compromise the state's ability to provide for the general welfare of
those on the island by interfering with efforts to provide public health, public
nutrition, education, sports, and culture.17 6 Second, sanctions have con-
strained the island's general industrial development and that of certain strate-
gic sectors, including biotechnology, tourism, transportation, mining, and
telecommunications."' It is in this context that the report points out how
sanctions have increased the costs of securing needed imports. 78 Finally,
sanctions severely limit the island's ability to promote its exports, including
health goods and services, agricultural products, tobacco, cobalt, nickel,
rum, and tourism services generally.' 9 The report estimates that forgone
export revenues for 2016 exceed $4 billion.'
The report lists over a dozen specific examples of how the extraterrito-
rial reach of U.S. sanctions harm not only Cuba, but also third parties.'8 '
The examples suggest how pervasively U.S. sanctions influence how other
countries and private firms relate to Cuba.18 2 The report superbly documents
the tidal wave of opposition to U.S. sanctions within the United States and
globally.'
"' During this period, OFAC imposed fines for Cuba-related activities on French bank
Cr6dit Agricole ($1.1 billion), U.S. insurer Navigators Insurance Company ($271 million),
German bank Commerzbank ($1.7 billion), U.S. firm Halliburton Atlantic Limited ($304 mil-
lion), U.S. design firm WATG Holdings ($140 million), and French company CGG Services
S.A. ($614 million). Id. at 8-10.
1' For example, in November 2015, PayPal blocked the payment of a German company
for tickets to a Cuban musical. A German court ordered PayPal to make the payment or face a
substantial fine. Id. at 9.
7 5 Id. at 28-31.
16 Id. at 12-17.
1 77 Id. at 18-22.
178 Id.
1' Id. at 23-27.
1w Id. at 23.
I81 Id. at 31-35.
182 Consider these examples: in July 2015, a Lebanese bank canceled the account of the
Cuban news agency after being warned by OFAC about a possible violation of sanctions, id. at
33; in September 2015, a British supermarket with U.S. investors began blocking all Cuban
products from its stores, id.; Cuba incurs additional freight and insurance expenses for all
marine transport because OFAC sanctions vessels that trade with the island, id. at 22; in De-
cember 2015 the Royal Bank of Canada closed a Eurodollar account held by Cubana Aviaci6n
to avoid sanction by OFAC, id. at 31; citing U.S. sanctions, a Danish transportation company
in September 2015 refused to transport the property of Cuban diplomats to the Danish em-
bassy, id.
183 Id. at 35-42.
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The report includes financial estimates of two kinds of harms caused by
U.S. sanctions - asset impairment (as would show up on a balance sheet)
and forgone receipts (as would be reflected on an income statement as an-
nual losses or negative income). The asset impairment figure is over $750
billion. 184 This estimate reflects harms to capital assets owned by the state,
infrastructure (e.g., highways, ports, and buildings), and sovereign in-
tangibles in the nature of goodwill that - though not liquid - represent
forms of value. The revenue loss figure is about $125 billion.' This esti-
mate includes inflows forgone because of sanctions, e.g., estimates of export
earnings and other forms of profit. Assets can be restated in terms of cash
flows and, vice versa, earnings streams can be capitalized and expressed as
assets; hence these two kinds of harms may represent alternative ways of
measuring related losses.
Asset impairment can increase or decrease each year based on how as-
set values fluctuate in a dynamic market. For example, the 2016 estimate of
asset loss is lower than the 2015 estimate.' This makes sense insofar as the
increase in asset value reflects the way that diplomatic normalization results
in a more optimistic assessment about Cuba's financial prospects going for-
ward. In contrast, estimates of forgone receipts (i.e., revenues and conse-
quential damages) are necessarily cumulative because each year's lost
revenue is stacked on top of the accumulated lost revenue. Therefore the
2016 estimate of foregone receipts exceeds the previous year by about
$4,500,000,000.187
B. Domestic Legal Actions for Harms to National Security
and the Economy
In 1999, Cuban plaintiffs filed two legal actions against the United
States in the Provincial Court of Havana (Tribunal Provincial Popular), one
a mass tort action for harms caused by U.S. covert operations ("Security
Complaint") and the other an action for economic harms caused by sanc-
tions ("Economic Complaint").'I Both actions rest on provisions of three
sources of Cuban law: the Constitution; 8 9 the Law of Civil, Administrative,
"4 Id. at 4.
185 Id.
1"6 The prior year estimate for asset loss was over $80 billion higher. 2015 CUBA REPORT,
supra note 18, at 4.
18 The prior year estimate for forgone receipts was $121,192,000,000. Id. at 4.
'" The other action also makes some allegations about harms caused by the covert secur-
ity operations of the United States. See Economic Complaint, supra note 21, at clauses 20-26,
30.
89 These sources include the following: Article 1, which lists political liberty, social jus-
tice, individual and collective wellbeing, and solidarity as guiding values; Article 12, which
asserts the primacy of sovereignty, autonomy, and self-determination as central to Cuba's anti-
imperialist nature; Article 14, which establishes socialist property and principles of redistribu-
tion; and Chapter VII (Articles 45-66), which sets out the rights and duties of individuals.
Economic Complaint, supra note 21.
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and Labor Procedures;1 90 and the Civil Code.19 ' The Economic Complaint
also relies on public international law.'" The plaintiffs are a coalition of law
professors and lawyers representing eight large federations: the Cuban
Workers Guild (Central de Trabajadores de Cuba, CTC), the National Asso-
ciation of Small Farmers (Asociacidn Nacional de Agricultores Pequefios,
ANAP), the Federation of Cuban Women (Federacidn de Mujeres Cubanas,
FMC); the Federation of University Students (Federaci6n Estudiantil
Universitaria, FEU), the Federation of Secondary School Teachers (Federa-
ci6n de Estudiantes de Ensefianza Media, FEEM), the Jos6 Martf Pioneers
Organization (Organizacidn de Pioneros Josi Marti, OPJM), the Committee
for the Defense of the Revolution (Comitis de Defensa de la Revolucidn,
CDR), and the Association of Veterans of the Cuban Revolution (Asociacidn
de Combatientes de la Revoluci6n Cubana, ACRC).
Are these plaintiffs state actors? At this point in the evolution of Cuban
society, the answer is probably "yes," although one should keep an open
mind about the extent to which non-state expectations animate these federa-
tions. These federations are comprised primarily of private individuals but,
to varying degrees, each one operates as a para-state entity because their
leadership tends to follow official policy. Nevertheless, the rank and file
membership tends to be entirely voluntary, suggesting the private choice as-
sociated with U.S. notions of civil society. Determining whether these fed-
erations are private parties, public instrumentalities, or an admixture of both
can be difficult because civil society in a socialist country does not map
neatly onto the U.S. paradigm in which it is relatively easy to distinguish
between private and public entities.
In both actions, the court held for the plaintiffs.1 93 However, these deci-
sions have not been enforced against the United States. The United States
'" Cited Articles include the following: Article 6, establishing the subject matter jurisdic-
tion of the court; Articles 8-10, which establish proper venue; Article 146, which establishes
the remedy; Articles 223 et seq., which set out the procedural requirements for the Complaint
and its annexes; and Articles 229, 230, and 170, which set out the standards for service of
process. Id.
'9 These provisions include the following: Article 16, which governs the choice of law for
the action; Articles 39-52, which establishes the standing to sue of the plaintiffs; Articles 81-
83, 111, and 47, which set out the standards for economic damages; Articles 85-87, which
provides for awards of consequential damages and legal costs; Article 95, which establishes a
general duty of care; Transitional Provisions, which determine the temporal applicability of
previous provisions; and Article 414, which addresses the qualifications of plaintiffs counsel.
Id.
192 The Complaint cites several sources, including the following: Org. of American States
[OAS] Charter art. 15; G.A. Res. 626 (VII) (Dec. 21, 1952); the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3;
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171; G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970); G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX) (Dec. 12,
1974). Id.
'9 See Tribunal Popular Provincial de Ciudad de la Habana [Provincial Court of Havana]
Expediente Civil No. 1/2000, May 5, 2000, Sentencia No. 47 (Cuba), reprinted in SENTENCIA
DEL TIBUUNAL PROVINCIAL POPULAR DE CHUDAD DE LA HABANA EN EL PROCESO POR LA
DEMANDA DEL PUEBLO DE CUBA CONTRA EL GOBIERNO DE ESTADOS UNIDOS POR Los DAfos
EcoNoMIcos OCASIONADOS A CUBA 98-99 (Editora Polftica, 2000).
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did not appear in the proceeding; hence the action lacks the adversarial op-
position that sharpens how issues are presented. Nonetheless, the theory of
liability that underlies these actions provides a basic frame for understanding
Cuba's claim against the United States for embargo losses.
The Security Complaint itemizes damages from death, personal injury,
and consequential damages. The calculation estimates damages for wrong-
ful death as a result of the embargo, physical disabilities attributed to the
embargo, and related damages from death or disability. The complaint tal-
lies 3,478 persons killed and 2,099 persons suffering disabling physical in-
jury as a result of U.S. sanctions.19 4 The dollar figures assigned to each item
are not as important as the attempt to make concrete the national interest that
has been harmed.
The Economic Complaint presents twenty-three substantive statements
of fact that address how U.S. sanctions have harmed Cuba.195 Parts of the
Complaint include specific line items for discrete harms. For example, the
additional defense and security costs are grouped under a single line item.
In addition to general damage estimates, the Complaint mentions harms to
particular sectors of the Cuban economy, including sugar, oil, electricity,
nickel, food, telecommunications, and agriculture generally.'9 Harms to the
fishing sector are separately itemized.1 97 Several entries address healthcare,
including the increased marginal costs of obtaining pharmaceuticals and
'" These damages are based on $30,000,000 for each wrongful death and $10,000,000 in
other damages. The disability damage estimates assign $15,000,000 per person plus
$5,000,000 in other damages. Though not separately itemized, the other damages can be seen
as substitutes for compensatory damages and punitive damages. See Security Complaint, supra
note 20.
' Each of the twenty three subsections examines an aspect of how U.S. sanctions have
adversely impacted the Cuban economy and society: (a) provides overall legal and historical
frame for Complaint; (b) sets out illegal nature of U.S. sanctions under public international
law; (c) analyzes the political contexts in the United States and Cuba when sanctions were first
imposed; (d) asserts that Cuba's responses to U.S. sanctions are legal exercises of sovereignty;
(e) analyzes how U.S. sanctions impact Cuban exports and imports of medical supplies; (f)
addresses U.S. sanctions from the presidency of Jimmy Carter until the early 1990s; (g) exam-
ines impact of Helms-Burton; (h) reviews the U.N. General Assembly's resolutions against
U.S. sanctions; (i) focuses on how U.S. sanctions have impacted the health of those who live in
Cuba; (j) emphasizes the broad impact that sanctions have had on standard of living and the
Cuban economy overall; (k) puts U.S. sanctions in the historical context of U.S. hegemonic
interests in Cuba before the Cuban Revolution; (1) discusses U.S. attempts to promote political
subversion on the island; (m) analyzes how the United States has promoted guerrilla activities
on the island; (n) examines early U.S. plans to overthrow the Cuban government after the
Revolution; (o) analyzes U.S. involvement in naval and air terrorism in Cuba; (p) focuses on
how U.S. sanctions adversely impact Cuban agriculture and fisheries; (q) analyzes how U.S.
sanctions have harmed Cuban industry; (r) reviews how Cuban transportation and infrastruc-
ture have suffered harms from U.S. sanctions; (s) analyzes the impact of U.S. sanctions on
education and human capital; (t) reviews the efforts of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency to
subvert the Cuban government; (u) links U.S. sanctions to biological warfare by arguing that
scarcity of pesticides and other supplies on health; (v) reviews U.S. media efforts to influence
public opinion on the island; and (w) analyzes how U.S. sanctions have obligated Cuba to
incur additional defense and security costs. See Economic Complaint, supra note 21.
'" Economic Complaint, supra note 21, at 11-13.
19 Id. at 24.
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medical supplies formerly obtained from the U.S. 98 Costs for additional
transportation and warehousing costs for pharmaceuticals and medical sup-
plies are separately itemized.'9 Additionally, the action estimates the cost of
adapting health care infrastructure on the island to function without access to
U.S. goods. 200
The Economic Complaint estimates the economic value of harms to
civilian mortality from nutritional disorders, dengue and other illnesses
whose treatment was compromised by U.S. restrictions on insecticides.201
The Complaint also itemizes particular maladies that have affected the is-
land's agriculture and livestock, including sigatoka plague (bananas), tristeza
del citrico, pulgdn negro, and hemorrhagic fever in rabbits. 202 The Com-
plaint also estimates the additional financing costs attributed to sanctions,
including increased foreign exchange costs due to the inability to use the
dollar, hardship in negotiating with external creditors, and increased costs of
credit.203
The Economic Complaint would benefit from more elaboration and
substantiation of these claims. Some entries are hard to understand because
the particular harm is not specified fully, for example as in the chilling effect
of the embargo on counterparties. 204 Some items would benefit from more
exposition, such as damages attributable to the embargo's restraint on travel
by U.S. citizens and residents subject to these limits.205 Much of the damage
reflects general harms to foreign trade. These costs include higher customs
duties, additional transportation expenses, extra postal costs, and other trans-
action costs in general. 206 Rather than valuing each harm individually, the
Economic Complaint aggregates these harms into a single number, making it
harder to appreciate the relative significance of the component harms. For
example, the costs of technology transfer, brain drain, and impaired export
markets are grouped together.207
As noted below, determining proximate causation for these harms also
means considering the extent to which the actions of the Cuban government
have contributed to these economic conditions. Doing so would not weaken
the basic claim for redress. Quite the contrary, it would make the argument
richer, more objective, and credible to a wider audience. In general, more
substantiation of the losses and explicit discussion of the assumptions behind
the valuation would be helpful.
'
98 Id. at 10.
199 Id.2
0 Id. at 11.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 32.
203 id.
204 Id.
205 Id.2 06 Id. at 11-13.
207 Id.
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IV. A FRAMEWORK FOR SOVEREIGN LIABILITY
Supportive of Cuba's claims against the United States, this article seeks
to supplement and qualify the arguments made in the Economic Complaint.
To that end, Part A suggests factors relevant to determining how Cuba can
show that U.S. sanctions have proximately caused harm to its economy. Part
B considers other legal issues raised by Cuba's claim.
A. U.S. Liability for Economic Coercion
Liability assumes breach of a duty and causation of harm. In the case
of economic coercion through sanctions, assigning proximate causation for
over-determined macroeconomic conditions influenced by half a century of
reciprocal hostilities is complex. This analysis starts by considering some of
the more challenging causation issues, including the extent to which Cuba's
harms may reflect the consequences of unsuccessful economic planning.
The rest of the analysis examines factors that argue for imposing sovereign
liability on the United States. First, sanctions since the 1990s violate nonin-
tervention duties found in treaty obligations undertaken by the United States.
Second, U.S. sanctions depart from other international standards for eco-
nomic aggression. Finally, and perhaps most seriously, as pursued by the
U.S. in Cuba, pursuing regime change in Cuba transgresses fundamental no-
tions of sovereignty.
1. Proximate Causation
The complex economic conditions that form the predicate for Cuba's
claim against the United States are over-determined in that the vast majority
of economic outcomes have multiple causes. How can proximate cause be
allocated between the competing causes-in-fact? Proving causation requires
imagining how the economy might have been without these sanctions, ad-
mittedly a speculative endeavor. For Cuba's damages claim to prosper, it
must show that the sanctions have proximately caused damages to the Cuban
economy.2 08
. Consider some of the preliminary economic issues raised by the ques-
tion. Part of the answer is empirical, i.e., how was trade and the economy
displaced because of the embargo? This involves asking several related
questions about the sanctions influenced the island's trade structure. To what
extent did the sanctioned country redirect trade into an alternative market?
How comparable were the alternative market to the U.S. market? Did Cuba
incur higher transportation and transaction costs? Did the substitute markets
208 Analytical methods that could be used to establish causation do exist, however. See,
e.g., Claudio E. Montenegro & Raimundo Soto, How Distorted is Cuba's Trade? Evidence and
Predictions from a Gravity Model, 5 J. OF INTL ThADE & ECON. DEV. 45 (1996); U.S. Agricul-
tural Sales to Cuba: Certain Economic Effects of U.S. Restrictions, Inv. No. 332-489, USITC
Pub. 3932 (July 2007) (Final).
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have comparable demand for the sanctioned country's products? Another
part of the enquiry is necessarily more speculative because it involves a
counterfactual question: How would an economy have behaved without
sanctions? Any answer to this question will be based on an economic
model. A third set of questions about causation raises even more contestable
issues. To what extent did Cuba's own actions cause or contribute to any of
these economic harms?
After all, Cuba has taken actions that may have contributed to the
harms caused by U.S. sanctions, so assigning proximate cause requires de-
termining the island's role in its own economic problems. Though it is rela-
tively easy to show that U.S. sanctions have harmed the Cuban economy,
assigning primary responsibility for Cuba's economic problems to U.S. pol-
icy ignores the actions of the Cuban state in contributing to these economic
problems. This does not refer to actions taken by Cuba that purport to jus-
tify U.S. policy. Instead, some of the proximate cause for the island's eco-
nomic development must belong to state policies. Cuba's participation in the
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (the Soviet trading bloc) should be
taken into account. Did participation in the Soviet trading system help or
hurt Cuban trade? Probably there is no simple answer, but this issue has a
bearing on how U.S. sanctions impacted Cuba's trade. For this reason, deter-
mining proximate cause requires considering Cuba's role in contributing to
its economic problems.
2. Violation of the Principle of Nonintervention
As a member state of multilateral organizations, the United States has
promised to refrain from intervention in the affairs of other countries, a logi-
cal corollary of respecting the sovereignty of other countries. Although the
United Nations Charter does not use the notion of nonintervention, respect
for the principle is a necessary corollary of several Charter provisions.2 09
Also, as a member of the Organization of American States, the United States
has undertaken to avoid intervention in the exercise of self-determination by
member states.210 The United States succeeded in having Cuba suspended
from the organization, but sanctions on Cuba impair the self-determination
of other member states that do want to interact with the island.
2 See Mige Kinaciglu, The Principle of Non-intervention at the United Nations: The
Charter Framework and tbe Legal Debate, PERCEPTIONS, Summer 2005, at 15, 38 (analyzing
the legal basis for the principle of nonintervention).
210 The Preamble to the Inter-American Democratic Charter cites respect for the principle
of nonintervention as one of the primordial purposes of the Organization of American States.
Org. of American States [OAS] Inter-American Democratic Charter pmbl. [ 1, 14 (Sep. 11,
2001), http://www.oas.org/OASpage/eng/Documents/DemocracticCharter.htm, archived at
https://perma.cc/J526-AT43; see also Organization of American States, Protocol of Amend-
ment to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance art. 2, July 26, 1975, O.A.S.T.S.
No. 46, 61, available at https://www.oas.org/Juridico/english/treaties/b-29(l).html, archived at
https://perma.cc/E6LL-9ZJA ("Nothing stipulated in this Treaty shall be interpreted as limiting
or impairing in any way the principle of non-intervention and the right of all States to choose
freely their political, economic and social organization.").
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3. Departure from International Norms About Economic Aggression
During the twentieth century, the consensus within the international
community emerged that individual states should generally avoid sanction-
ing other states, unless it is on behalf of the international community. 2 11 Its
charter grants the United Nations legal authority to promote global peace by
punishing an aggressor state that is ignoring or violating an international law
obligation.212 Under Article 41, the U.N. Security Council decides when to
subject a member country to economic sanctions, which other member coun-
tries are expected to obey.213 If economic sanctions do not remedy the ag-
gression or breach of peace, Article 42 allows the Security Council to use
military force.2 14
At present, economic sanctions are a fairly routine aspect of the interna-
tional system, as evidenced by the many Article 41 sanctions that have been
imposed. 215 Indeed, the United Nations maintains a database of nearly 1,000
entities and individuals subject to sanctions of the Security Council. 21 6 For
example, between 1990 and 1991, the Security Council passed two resolu-
tions (Resolution 661 of 1990 and Resolution 687 of 1991) which imposed
an economic embargo on Iraq's oil trade. Ordinary Iraqis suffered pro-
foundly. As a result, the United Nations started to emphasize harms to civil-
ian populations caused by economic sanctions. These efforts culminated in
the publication of the Bossuyt Report, which analyzed the human rights im-
plications of economic sanctions. 2 17 Even so, U.N. sanctions can impose
substantial hardships on countries, including their civilian populations.
When the United Nations imposes sanctions, it must follow explicit cri-
teria that promote "smart" sanctions, in the sense that they are rationally
related to a legitimate end, likely to bring about the intended result, and
implemented so as to visit minimal harm to third parties, including civilian
members of the sanctioned state.2 8 Many of the criteria examine the ratio-
211 See Paul Szasz, The Law of Economic Sanctions, in 71 INT'L_ L. STUD. 455, 458
(Michael N. Schmitt & Leslie C. Green eds., 1998).
212 U.N. Charter art. 39.
213 These sanctions "may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations
and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the
severance of diplomatic relations." U.N. Charter art. 41.
214 Use of force may include "demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea,
or land forces of the Members of the United Nations." U.N. Charter art. 42.
215 These include the following: Rhodesia (1965); South Africa (1977-1994); Iraq (1990);
Yugoslavia (1991-1996); Somalia (1992); Libya (1992); Liberia (1992); Haiti (1993); Angola
(1993); Rwanda (1994); Sudan (1996); and Sierra Leone (1997). See Consolidated United
Nations Security Council Sanctions List, U.N.S.C. SUBSIDIARY ORGANS, https:/scsanctions.un.
org/consolidated/, archived at https://perma.cc/CB8A-BS2E.
216 Id.
211 See generally U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Human Rights, The Adverse
Consequences of Econ. Sanctions on the Enjoyment of Human Rights, Working Paper Pre-
pared by Marc Bossuyt, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/33 (2000).
218 See SEC. COUNcL REPORT, UN SANcIoNs 6 (2013), available at http://www.security
councilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/specialre
search-report sanctions_2013.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/8H2Z-W9FM.
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nale for sanctions and their design. For example, before imposing sanctions
the U.N. considers the nature of the international wrong that triggered the
sanctions and the intended outcome of the sanctions. In general, the U.N.
will impose sanctions to compel a member country to comply with the direc-
tives of the Security Council. Whether or not sanctions will be effective in
seeking the desired harm matters too. Sanctions should also be limited in
scope so as to target only the intended harm. These best practices in sanc-
tions evidence the way that the U.N. has taken to heart lessons from the
harms caused by economic sanctions
According to these norms, sanctions should avoid harm to the civilian
population, especially starvation. Moreover, sanctions should also enjoy
some degree of support from the civilian population of the sanctioned coun-
try.2 19 Other criteria apply to the implementation of sanctions. They should
be monitored periodically and reviewable to determine their ongoing rele-
vance. Sanctions should also minimize any adverse impact to third parties,
such as other governments or private entities. Moreover, the civilian popula-
tion of a sanctioned country figures prominently in the assessment of the
United Nations as to whether sanctions are feasible. Nevertheless, despite
the attempt to impose economic sanctions surgically, under the best of cir-
cumstances they will visit harms on innocent third parties, especially the
civilian population.
In their current form, U.S. sanctions on Cuba deviate substantially from
the criteria applied to multinational sanctions. First, the justification for
these unilateral sanctions was not an international wrong but an unresolved
dispute about claims valuation and settlement between the U.S. and Cuba.
Second, insofar as they promote regime change through an internal revolt,
the sanctions promote harm to civilians as one the intended outcomes of
U.S. sanctions since it is through such harm that enough social unrest can be
stirred up to propel a regime change. Based on my experience, there is very
little support on the island for U.S. sanctions.220 Granted, it may be difficult
to meaningfully assess majority preferences in Cuba, in part because of its
history with a strong security establishment and a weak media environment.
In terms of efficacy, U.S. sanctions have not secured regime change, but
they have accomplished the intermediate goal of promoting economic depri-
vation for the civilian population. To the extent that U.S. sanctions intend
harm to civilians, these sanctions merit punishment to signal the unac-
ceptability of this type of state violence.
These sanctions should be evaluated in the context of the unique eco-
nomic position of the United States, whose commercial and financial advan-
tages make it an unrivaled trading counterparty. As one of the world's two
219 See Senator Robert G. Torricelli, Remarks at the Council on Foreign Relations Great
Debate Series: Sanctions Against Rogue States: Do They Work? (May 20, 1998) (on file with
author); Anna Segall, Economic Sanctions: Legal and Policy Constraints, 81 I'TL REV. OF
THE RED CROss 763, 776 (1999).
220 During the more than twenty-five years that I have been visiting Cuba, I have yet to
find one person who supports continuing these sanctions.
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largest markets for imports, access to the United States is crucial for any
country eager to trade.221 The United States is also one of world's two largest
export markets, hence importing countries may be unable to find substitute
products in other countries. The U.S. dollar is the world's most important
currency, so access to the dollar as an international reserve asset and a pay-
ment instrument is valuable. As a financial Great Power, the United States
has jurisdiction over many of the world's largest sources of credit and bank.
It is also a country that exports substantial capital through foreign direct
investment. In terms of its geopolitical influence, the United States has an
unrivaled network of allies on which it can lean in furtherance of its poli-
cies.222 When focused on isolating a country, these advantages make the
United States an enemy without peer.
U.S. sanctions deviate from international practice in other ways as well.
In terms of rationality review by an independent authority, there seems to be
none for U.S. sanctions against Cuba. State action taken under the Trading
with the Enemy Act can be arbitrary and capricious. In other words, a fed-
eral court considering the Constitutionality of action taken against an enemy
has no legal hook to overturn the sanctions.
Moreover, U.S. sanctions interfere not only with Cuba's economy but
also with those of other countries that favor economic activity with the is-
land. These sanctions involve an unprecedented degree of extraterritoriality
on the part of U.S. foreign policy insofar as they purport to punish other
countries and their nationals for engaging in prohibited transactions with the
island. In doing so, the Cuba sanctions interfere with the freedom of action
of these third parties to the unresolved dispute between Cuba and the United
States. While a licit embargo limits bilateral trade relationship between the
sanctioning and the sanctioned country, a blockade reaches much farther be-
cause it attempts to limit the sanctioned country's access to third parties,
including other countries. In an earlier era, one country would block physi-
cal access by surrounding the ports of the sanctioned country with warships.
Today, countries have other ways of accomplishing the same thing.
Especially since the enactment of the Helms-Burton Act, several coun-
tries have complained about the attempted extraterritorial reach of these
sanctions. After the passage of Helms-Burton, several U.S. allies adopted
statutory countermeasures to Helms-Burton to protest the purported extrater-
ritorial reach of the U.S statute. 223 At the time, many doubted whether Con-
gress had Constitutional authority to enact several of the provisions in
221 See Anders Grath, TiiE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCE 3 (2014)
(listing leading importing and exporting countries).
22 For example, the U.S. Commerce Department enforces anti-boycott regulations that
prohibit private companies from participating in economic boycotts in which the United States
does not participate. See Kim Strosnider & Christine Minarich, U.S. Antiboycott Laws: Over-
view and Compliance Strategies, WORLD ECR, Apr. 2012, at 1, available at https://www.
cov.com/-/media/files/corporate/publications/2012/04/us-antiboycott_1aws-overviewcom
pliance strategies.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/WB3U-7USS.
223 See EMBARGO o BIoQuto, supra note 26, 242-49 (discussing countermeasures to
Helms-Burton taken by Canada, the European Union, Mexico, and Spain).
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Helms-Burton, because the jurisdiction of the executive branch over foreign
affairs is different from that of the legislative branch.
One argument against recognizing U.S. liability for embargo losses is
that doing so would create a new international duty that would be difficult to
apply but that could generate liability widely. Though a reasonable concern,
the facts surrounding U.S. sanctions are so distinctive that even other exam-
ples of sanctions are unlikely to rise to the level of economic interference
that Cuba has suffered.
4. Regime Change Cuban-Style
International law does recognize one important justification for pursu-
ing regime change: to secure human rights that an incumbent government is
abusing.2 24 If the abuse is serious enough, the international community will
come together in a show of support for a regime change, even when pursued-
unilaterally without the prior approval of the United Nations or other coun-
tries. 225 W. Michael Reisman suggests several criteria for evaluating the
lawfulness under international law of attempts to carry out regime change of
a foreign country. 226 First, the incumbent government must be generally
condemned as pathological. Second, the goal of the regime change cannot
be to increase the influence of the intervening state in the country or region.
Third, the change must be feasible and implementable within a reasonable
period. Finally, in the long run the regime change promotes order in the
target state.
Measured against these criteria, U.S. sanctions fare poorly. Not only is
Cuba not widely condemned but, too many, the island's resistance to the
United States has made it a beacon of nationalist self-determination, includ-
ing for many Third World countries for whom Fidel Castro was a global
leader. 227 Given the history of hegemonic grasping in the region by the
United States, Cuba sanctions on Cuba seem consistent with these geopoliti-
cal aspirations. That these sanctions have lasted for so long and that - if
anything - they have helped to consolidate the targeted regime suggests
that the stated outcome was not a plausible outcome. That said, Cuba's
hands are not entirely clean when it comes to protesting the regime change
2 2 4 W. MICHAEL REISMAN, YALE LAW ScH. FACULTY SCHOLARSHIP SERIES, PAPER No.
1003, WHY REGIME CHANGE IS (ALMOsT ALWAYS) A BAD IDEA 1 (2004), available at http://
digitalcommons.law.yale.edulfsspapers/1003, archived at https://perma.cc/VEK8-LVV9.
225 Reisman gives three examples of such unilateral interventions (all from 1979) which
met with substantial approval in the international community: Tanzania's incursion into
Uganda to expel Idi Amin; France's intervention in the Central African Republic to imprison
its emperor, Jean Bedel Bokassa; and Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia to expel the Khmer
Rouge. Id. at 518.
226 Id. at 520.
227 See Fidel Castro's Death - World Reactions, AL JAZEERA NEWS (Nov. 26, 2016), http://
www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/11/fidel-castro-death-world-reactions-1 61126095542185.html,
archived at https://perma.cc/8V3T-UN27 ("In Venezuela, a long-time ally of Cuba and
staunch opponent of the political stance of the United States, President Nicolas Maduro said
Castro had inspired, and would continue to inspire, his country.").
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polices of the United States. Earlier in its history, Cuba's foreign policy
supported the export of violent revolution to other countries, captured fa-
mously in Che Guevara's exhortation to create "two, three, or many
Vietnams." 228
The U.S. formula for regime change in Cuba differs from the standard
formula. Regime change tends to refer to an armed intervention of a sover-
eign state by one or more foreign powers, typically in response to allegations
of human rights abuses. 229 However, in the case of Cuba, the United States
intends no such intervention. Instead, the goal of U.S. sanctions is to mobil-
ize forces on the island to carry out or at least initiate a regime change. So,
this iteration of regime change assumes that either the military or civilians
will succeed in driving out the incumbent Cuban government. A peaceful
protest is unlikely to serve this purpose. Similarly, an altercation that the
government succeeds in putting down - el Maleconazo of 1994, for exam-
ple - merely reinforces the impression of government power, that way dis-
couraging future such forms of resistance.230 Given the possibility of failure,
the imagined insurgents must be willing to suffer not only death in combat
but reprisal at the hands of the government. Moreover, if the scenario un-
folds as contemplated, social control may break down, making it harder to
chart a stable path towards reconstruction.
The intent to deploy civilians in ways that expose them to risk, vio-
lence, and, perhaps, death argues strongly for imposing liability on the
United States for its policies. Granted, many of the sanctions strategies
against Cuba pursued by the United States have de facto harmed civilians.
Suspending the sugar quota in 1960 might have foreseeably caused harm to
civilians, but any such harm can be seen as an unintended collateral harm of
the policy. Similarly, Cold War containment also negatively impacted Cu-
" Che Predicts "Two, Three, Many Vietnams", HERB: RESOURCES FOR TEACHERS, https:/
/herb.ashp.cuny.edu/items/show/518, archived at https://perma.cc/8K3X-SVH5 (last visited
Apr. 28, 2017) (quoting RoBERT H. HOLDEN & ERIC ZoLOv, LATIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED
STATES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 242-43 (2000)) ("What a luminous, near future would be
visible to us if two, three, or many Vietnams flourished throughout the world with their share
of death and their immense tragedies, their everyday heroism and their repeated blows against
imperialism obliging it to disperse its forces under the attack and the increasing hatred of all
the peoples of the earth!") (emphasis added).
229 In W. Michael Reisman's review of thirteen recent examples of regime change, all but
one involved a formal intervention by a country's armed forces. See REISMAN, supra note 224,
at I (mentioning regime change in Afghanistan, East Timor, Haiti, Iraq, Kosovo, Lebanon,
Namibia, Panama, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Vietnam, and former Yugoslavia). The one excep-
tion is Nicaragua, in which the United States covertly supported the Contras, a para-military
brigade. This attempt at regime change gave rise to a decision by the World Court finding
against the United States. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, 1 292 (June 27), available at http://
www.worldlii.org/int/cases/ICJ/1986/1.html, archived at https://perma.cc/2EB7-L6HK.
230 On August 5 and August 6 of 1994, a group of Cubans (at least a hundred) gathered on
el Malec6n to express their objections to the Cuban government. Cuban security forces put
down the protest and detained many of the protestors. For footage of the event, see Net for
Cuba Videos, El Maleconazo en Cuba - 1994 (Archivo hist6rico), YOUThBE (July 23, 2011),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= aot-DDJGIRw, archived at https://perma.cc/JDC2-
W8YY.
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ban civilians because they remained unable to access the goods and services
on which the standard of living had been based before the Revolution. How-
ever, de facto harm differs from the premeditated use of civilians to strategi-
cally destabilize an authoritarian regime.
B. Other Legal Issues
Assuming that an adequate theory of sovereign liability exists, Cuba's
claim presents several preliminary issues that impact its viability: (i) identi-
fying a forum, (ii) reckoning with complex valuation issues, and (iii) fash-
ioning a relevant remedy.
1. Agreeing on a Forum and Jurisdiction
The Cuban lawsuit examined in Part III took place in a domestic court
on the island, but permanent resolution of this issue will require a mecha-
nism whose jurisdiction is recognized by both countries. Otherwise, a coun-
try can ignore an unfavorable international judgment. The paradigm
example is the refusal by the United State to obey an International Court of
Justice decision awarding damages to Nicaragua for U.S. involvement in
supporting armed insurrection in Nicaraguan territory. 231 After this decision,
the United States withdrew from the International Court of Justice. The
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal may be a good model for this dispute.23 2 Thank-
fully, since the resumption of diplomatic relations the United States and
Cuba have created new bilateral mechanisms for discussing questions of mu-
tual interest.
2. Theorizing Valuation
In its reports to the United Nations, Cuba has quantified the value of
harms suffered as a result of U.S. sanctions. Although assigning a dollar
value to these harms makes them seem more concrete, any consensual settle-
ment of these issues requires agreement - admittedly at a certain level of
generality - on the kinds of injuries that give rise to liability. So, theo-
rizing valuation must precede any actual attempt to monetize the liability.
After suggesting four general interests worthy of protection through liability,
the discussion below acknowledges some of the special challenges of
valuation.
231 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Judgment, 1986 1.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 292 (June 27), available at http://www.worldlii.org/int/cases/
ICJ/1986/1.html, archived at https://perma.cc/2EB7-L6HK. The United States was able to
block enforcement of the judgment by the United Nations Security Council. See U.N. SCOR,
41st Sess., 2718th mtg. at 43, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2718 (Oct. 28, 1986).
232 See About the Tribunal, IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL, https://www.iusct.net/Pages/
Public/A-About.aspx, archived at https://perma.cc/M9JM-F383 (last visited Apr. 28, 2017).
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First, as U.S. sanctions have caused damage to the island's economic
infrastructure a recovery should compensate Cuba for the cost of rebuilding
structural elements in its economy. This includes not only physical infra-
structure like highways and ports but, importantly, intangibles that give rise
to economic advantage just as they do with private corporations. For exam-
ple, access to the global value chains analyzed in the previous Part is a basic
intangible that today serves as a prerequisite for any substantial foreign
trade. Insofar as U.S. sanctions have caused relational harms that impede
the island's ability to compete for chain access a recovery should indemnify
the island for these harms. This argument understands the Cuban economy
as a balance sheet with physical and intangible assets.
Second, insofar as U.S. sanctions have reduced profits - in particular
those giving rise to foreign exchange - a recovery should compensate the
island for these lost earnings. To a certain extent, this damage reflects harms
to economic infrastructure, but lost profits can be analyzed in a more granu-
lar way by looking at particular commodities - like sugar and nickel - and
service exports, like tourism. This argument sees the Cuban economy in
terms of its periodic profits and losses.
Third, injury to Cubans on the island whose fundamental rights have
been violated by sanctions should give rise to liability. For example, the
mass tort action analyzed above estimates the human capital costs of wrong-
ful death, physical harms, and consequential damages caused by sanctions.
Fourth, to the extent that U.S. sanctions have involved gross violations
of international standards of justice and fair play, the U.S. should incur ex-
emplary punitive damages to signal moral and multilateral disapproval of its
actions towards the island. Like punitive damages generally, this argument
looks not primarily at the Cuban economy but, instead, at the culpability of
U.S. actions.
Finally, interest is appropriate given how much time has elapsed. Pick-
ing a discount rate to deal with inflation and the consequences of the passage
of time, however, is complicated because of the extraordinary duration of
U.S. sanctions on Cuba.
Assuming that Cuba and the United States can agree on the sovereign
interests worthy of compensation, quantifying the harm faces several chal-
lenges. Finding comparable economic information about Cuba and other
countries can be difficult because many important datasets do not have bal-
ance of payments and other macroeconomic data about the island.233 Even if
this data were available, though, there is no numerically meaningful way to
reduce these harms to a single monetary value, in part because the harms
involve sovereign interests that are heavily intangible for which there are no
233 For example, the World Bank maintains a useful dataset that expresses a country's
exports as a percent of its gross domestic product, but Cuba is not covered. See Exports of
goods and services (% of GDP), WoRAD BANK (2017), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS, archived at https://perma.cc/2VH8-PB8H.
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real market proxies. Moreover, the passage of time makes any single num-
ber even less meaningful.
Moreover, the differences between socialist and capitalist property
make valuation quite difficult. Although the Cuban government is the titular
holder of these economic interests, to a large extent the government acts as a
proxy for the island's people. Under Cuba's system of socialist property, the
Cuban state holds national resources in trust on behalf of its people. Insofar
as U.S. sanctions harm Cuban state property - including its trading advan-
tages - they are, in effect, harming the economic interests of the private
citizens, i.e., the beneficiaries of property held in trust by the Cuban govern-
ment. It is as though the U.S. government expropriated the property of Cu-
ban nationals.2 34
In general, though, expropriation refers to a country's taking of property
within its jurisdiction, typically for some public policy purpose. Admittedly,
the most serious harms caused by U.S. sanctions happen beyond the territo-
rial jurisdiction of the U.S., e.g., those occurring on the island and with re-
spect to other countries whose ability to deal with Cuba has been curtailed.
So, analogizing U.S. sanctions to an expropriation is strongest for property
within the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S. Nevertheless, U.S. power
reaches far beyond its territorial limits and, to a certain extent, beyond its
legal limits as recognized under public international law. This surplus of
effective power exposes the U.S. to the equitable claim that its unilateral
actions in isolating Cuba are as much an expropriation as the taking of prop-
erty on U.S. soil.
3. Fashioning a Meaningful Remedy
What remedy makes sense to compensate for any harm done to the
Cuban economy by virtue of U.S. sanctions? For many years, Cuba has
been estimating the monetary value of these harms, expressed as U.S. dollars
or Cuban pesos.235 These estimates may help to establish the magnitude of
these harms, but money damages may fall short because the most valuable
losses include intangibles and public goods that money alone cannot restore.
Although U.S. sanctions have remained essentially the same, the struc-
ture of global trade and Cuba's economy has kept changing. Since the 1960s
the structure of international trade has changed in response to deregulation,
technology, and reduced transportation costs. When Eisenhower warned
about the rise of an "industrial military complex" in his last speech as Presi-
dent in 1961, national conglomerates dominated much international trade.
These conglomerates were based in one country but had a sprawling network
of subsidiaries and affiliates joined through corporate and national affinity. 236
234 This theory of liability is consistent with the claims program adopted by Cuba in 1996
in Statute #80. See supra Part H.C.
235 See, e.g., Economic Complaint supra note 21.
236 It was an ironic message coming from a five-star general: "[i]n the councils of gov-
ernment, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or
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The operating context for today's multinationals differs from that for the
national conglomerate in several important ways. First, transnational com-
munication has become dramatically cheaper, especially through digital me-
dia. To a lesser extent, transportation costs have also declined. Hence the
accidental location of resources is a less of constraint than it once was. Re-
duced transactions costs for global trade mean that a business can accom-
plish a similar degree of control over the production and distribution process
without having to absorb foreign firms. Instead, using contracts and market
power an ultimate consumer can direct the way that its upstream suppliers
and related counterparties arrange their affairs through a value chain.2 37
Second, ideological shifts beginning in the 1980s have reduced the ex-
tent to which countries block access to their markets, reducing the link be-
tween country and conglomerate. This happened as neoliberal ideologies
and deregulation took root in major Western powers, who tried to export
these ideologies to other countries. In the case of Latin America, the Wash-
ington Consensus brought together a set of integrated policy reforms de-
signed to promote trade in the region.238
As a result of these changes, many countries have reduced tariff barri-
ers and surrendered control over their capital flows. Treaty-based multilat-
eral organizations have worked together to promote a more standardized
regulatory regime for cross-border trade. The International Monetary Fund
has succeeded in getting many countries to surrender control over capital,
including volatile streams of "hot money." Though several member coun-
tries objected consistently along the way, these organizations acted in essen-
tial alignment in promoting many of the economic policies that ushered in a
more linked global trading system. Finally, geopolitical changes have re-
zoned trading markets.23 9 After the Soviet Union's Council for Mutual Eco-
nomic Assistance broke up in 1991, markets that had previously been
limited to the Soviet cartel opened up. Also, during this period the European
Union increased its membership and expanded the size of its common
market.
Central to this form of industrial organization is the idea of global value
chains, a strategic pattern of sequential processes that link steps from frag-
unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced
power exists, and will persist." President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Farewell Address (Jan. 17,
1961).
237 One implication is that to get a more accurate picture of a country's trade position, it is
not enough to measure gross exports, because those exports may contain a substantial amount
of imports from upstream members of the chain. So, it becomes necessary to identify how
much domestic value has been added to a product before it is exported to the next link in the
chain.
238 See Williamson, supra note 34.
239 Bucking the orthodoxies about comparative advantage in international trade, some
countries like Peru and Brazil have succeeded in building domestic markets that reduce the
country's exposure to global cycles. Alternative markets do exist, although they are, to some
extent determined in reference to these value chains. For example, the ALBA represents per-
haps the largest trading block explicitly outside of the liberal global trading system. Alejandro
Foxley, Regional Trade Blocs: The Way to the Future?, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L
PEACE (2010).
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mented and globally dispersed design, production, marketing, finance, and
distribution processes.2 40 Theorized by Harvard Business School professor
Michael Porter, a value chain is a systematic way of mapping how an enter-
prise produces value through a sequential production process that involves
upstream suppliers and downstream clients.2 4 1 The chain is predicated on a
market in which economic processes that were formerly aggregated into a
single factory or operating unit fragmented into separate operating units.
The chain captures value through efficiencies produced by its relationship
with the chain's other links, which represent different parts of fragmented
processes through which production, distribution, marketing, and financing
take place. These chains are controlled by powerful multinational enter-
prises with few national loyalties. 242
Today, these value chains operate as relatively stateless entities that es-
tablish and quickly reconfigure their operations in shifting patterns across
states. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment, over 80% of the world's trade is funneled through these chains.2 43 To-
day the wealth of nations consists of access to these chains. It is not enough
to have a good product. The country must be connected, much more than in
a previous time because multinational firms exercise enormous influence
over individual national governments.
To its detriment, however, Cuba generally remains outside of the chain
economy. In part, this reflects its socialist orientation, however, U.S. sanc-
tions have contributed to this economic exclusion. Insofar as the embargo
blocks or reduces the relationships that make possible access into the value
chain, the effect of the sanctions is more pronounced than in a market where
relational bargaining determines the distribution and price outcomes. So,
sanctions deprive the island not just of a particular import or export market
but, more fundamentally, of the basic structure of international trade.
In order to make the remedy respond to the harm, the United States
could affirmatively undertake to help situate Cuba in these trade and invest-
ment chains. So rather than just a transfer payment, it might be better for the
United States to bring its substantial resources to bear to help the island
240 See Llizaro Pefia, Presented at XV Edition of Conversations, Cuban Ministry of Exter-
nal Relations, Havana: Cadenas Globales de Valor en la Agroindustria y las Perspectivas de
Inserci6n Para Cuba Despuds de Diciembre del 2014 (Dec. 15, 2016).
241 MICHAEL PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE: CREATING AND SUSTAINING SUPERIOR
PERFORMANCE 33-61 (1998).
242 The popularity of research on supply chains is perhaps the most visible example of the
value chain, but the institution reaches more broadly into financing, distribution, marketing,
and other business functions. Consider Walmart. As a dominant end-purchaser of products,
Walmart has enough market power to mandate the business models that its suppliers should
follow. Instead of having a vertically-integrated conglomerate with a holding company that
owns the upstream and downstream entities relevant to production and distribution, Walmart
uses contracts to fix its terms with suppliers. As the ultimate buyer, Walmart guards access to
the value chain.
243 U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2013:
GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS, at x, U.N. Sales No. E.13.II.D.5 (2013), available at http://
unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir20l3_en.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/Z3K2-2SDH.
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rebuild its export markets, obtain financing for trade and development, and
shore up Cuba's economic infrastructure, including its price mechanism.
In the context of multilateral development lending coordinated by the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, such reconstruction
projects come with strings attached, so called "conditionality" in develop-
ment parlance. Historically, the goal of these conditions was to make coun-
tries conform more closely to macroeconomic policies conducive to
globalization. In the special case of Cuba, a different approach is in order.
The Cuban Communist Party has committed to reforming the island's eco-
nomic structure, but only as part of an ongoing commitment to socialist prin-
ciples. In the interest of Cuba's self-determination, any plan for
reconstruction or development should respect this commitment.
V. FROM NATIONAL MITOSIs To SYNTHESIS
Advocacy in a heated and long-standing dispute, this Article has em-
phasized zero-sum arguments, opposing claims, and adverse interests. In
closing, let me shift the perspective somewhat to consider what Cuba's claim
against the United States and its resolution might mean for Cuban-Ameri-
cans, Cubans on the island, and other Cubans in diaspora. To that end, the
issue involves transculturation.
Cuban anthropologist Fernando Ortfz coined the concept of transcul-
turation to refer to the blending of European, indigenous, African, mulatto,
and creole cultures that took place in Cuba. 244 These same cultures came
together in other Spanish colonial centers, but, at one level in Lima, these
racial categories remained set off from each other. The best example of
these racial demarcations is Latin American caste painting, a genre that clas-
sified racial outcomes pictorially in portraits of a couple and their child.
These portraits would label the race of each parent and of the child, whose
racial class was a function of the parents' races. 245
Like a Mendelian chart of breeding outcomes, caste painting mapped
how the laws of race produced a hermetic and predictable racial order (and,
consequently, a social one too). The system was built on defined racial clas-
ses: peninsulares (Spaniards and other Europeans born abroad); criollos
(Spaniards and Europeans born in the New World); indios (native Ameri-
cans); mestizos (children of indios and Europeans); cholos (children of in-
dios and mestizos); mulatos (children of African and European parents); and
zambos (children of indios and Africans) among others. 246 In the system, the
peninsulares, indios, and Africans were racially pure because every other
category reflected a racial blend.
2" See FERNANDO ORTiz, Los NEGROS CURROS 1-6 (1993).
245 See MANUEL ALVAR, LExICO DEL MESTIZAJE EN HSPANOAMERICA 23-28 (1987).
246 Much as the forms of action rule us from the grave, so too do these racial caste catego-
ries continue to influence the popular imagination, as reflected in the slang use of some of
these terms, e.g., cholo, zambo, and mestizo.
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To a certain extent, caste painting projected and enforced a Cartesian
ideal about racial purity, perhaps also reflecting an anxious attempt to im-
pose order on mating practices that disrupted social ideals. Racial hybridity
was particularly relevant in Cuba, where conditions encouraged racial blend-
ing. Ortfz called the process by which these hybrid racial mixtures emerged
"transculturation," to emphasize the way that circumstances and socializa-
tion (rather than genes) could create new blends. It remains a quintessen-
tially Cuban way of understanding hybridity, not only of race but, more
generally, of categories.
After the Cuban Revolution, the Cuban nation underwent mitosis, split-
ting into two ethnic pools with the same cultural DNA but destined for radi-
cally different forms of expression. Most Cubans who came to the United
States experienced the travails of diaspora, learning to adapt to a language,
country, and culture that were not their own.2 47 Some would never adapt and
others would remain permanently ambivalent about a place that could never
feel like home. Others took to the United States and, over time, became
enthusiastically aligned with the place. In diaspora in the United States,
these Cubans transformed as they integrated a new country with their
identities.
Those who stayed in Cuba also underwent a transformation, starting
with the social rupture caused when many Cubans left for the United States.
The Socialist restructuring of society and the economy transformed those
who stayed. Island Cubans would experience the United States quite differ-
ently from those in diaspora. The United States would loom large on the
island, not only because of its physical proximity but because U.S. hostility
towards Cuba would become a central pillar of government communica-
tions. At the same time, the negative impact of U.S. sanctions on Cuba
would be felt widely.
Over time, these two ethnic pools (really sub-strains of the same nation)
became deeply individuated, giving rise to two deeply situated ways of
thinking about Cuba that reflect these two different transculturation
processes: exile-speak and island-speak. Dueling Orwellian paradigms, each
one shapes reality by denying some facts and emphasizing others.248 Canon-
ical, orthodox, and reductionist, both paradigms break with Cuban traditions
of hybridity and amalgamation, the forces behind the transculturation that
Fernando Ortfz signaled.
Consider how Cuba's complex political traditions fractured into two in-
complete discourses after the Revolution. Many Cuban-Americans (espe-
cially those in Miami) became radicalized right-ward, drawing on the power
of the United States to punish a former homeland and to stop the clock,
existentially speaking. A similar process happened on the island, where val-
247 This is true as well for Cubans who emigrated elsewhere, but the Cuban experience of
diaspora in the United States is distinctive because of its scale.
2" Writing as a Cuban-American in Miami, Frank Valdes notes the difficulty of tran-
scending this binary. See Francisco Valdes, Diaspora and Deadlock, Miami and Havana:
Coming To Terms With Dreams and Dogmas, 55 FLA. L. REv. 283 (2003).
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uable commitments to social equity hardened into rigid doctrines of social
control. In both cases, the ecumenical expansiveness of Cuban social and
political values disappeared, an absence one hears in the duel between exile-
speak and island-speak.
Exile-speak reflects the preferences and values of many in the Cuban-
American community who emigrated after the Cuban Revolution, remained
profoundly identified with pre-Revolutionary Cuba, yet never returned. This
register emphasizes that Cuban-Americans live in exile (because they were
forced to leave the island) not in diaspora (which may involve a voluntary
decision to leave). U.S. sanctions constitute a lawful embargo for legitimate
state interests rather than a blockade whose extraterritorial reach violates
international law and lacerates civilians on the island. In this discursive real-
ity, U.S. policy toward Cuba is justified because it promotes human rights
and democracy, each of which is loaded down with connotations. More than
mere words, exile-speak implies a theory of causation about Cuba's harms, a
particular historical account of what happened in Cuba, a self-concept as a
virtuous and embattled exile community holding the high moral ground, and
blames the problems with the Cuban economy on Fidel Castro, Raul Castro,
and other Cuban officials. Exile-speak is the language of U.S. foreign pol-
icy. Exile-speak takes a special form for children and grandchildren of dias-
pora Cuban-Americans. 2 49
In contrast, island-speak encodes the worldview of those whose identity
remains tied to the lived social realities on the island. Most of them have
never been to the United States, but that country's foreign policy looms large
in their imagination because of its impact on the island's economy and soci-
ety. This is the register of the Cuban government. In this view, Cuban-
Americans and others who left the island did so voluntarily because they
rejected the social values of the Cuban Revolution. The dominant themes in
this discourse are self-determination, freedom, and equality, framed against
the background of persecution by the world's largest Goliath. From this per-
spective, U.S. efforts to promote democracy involve clandestine and disin-
genuous attempts by a foreign power to mobilize island residents
improperly, including by purchasing their loyalty.250 Of special interest to
249 Many among these younger generations uncritically introject the traumatized perspec-
tives of their parents and grandparents out of a sense of filial piety. The introject can then
form the basis for rigidly-held views on Cuba. Elsewhere I have urged these younger genera-
tions to address the Cuban-American Oedipal conflict, in which routine intergenerational ten-
sions play out on a geopolitical field. See generally CUBAN CLAIM4s, supra 22.
250 For example, some of the most vaunted examples of Cuba's human rights violations
revolve around the Ladies in White (Damas de Blanco), an activist group composed originally
of wives of former political prisoners styled after Argentina's Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo.
In Miami, the Ladies in White enjoy totemic status as human rights martyrs. There is more
here than meets the eye, however, because of their ties to the regime change machinations of
the United States. See generally Lorraine Bayard de Volo, Heroines With Friends In High
Places: Cuba's Damas de Blanco, N. AM. CONG. ON LAUIN AM., Sept.-Oct. 2011, at 19, avail-
able at https://nacla.org/article/heroines-friends-high-places-cuba%E2%80%99s-damas-de-bla
nco, archived at https://perma.cc/F342-QLRW (noting the disavowal of the Ladies in White by
a founder of the original Argentine group). There are legitimate groups on the island advocat-
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my argument, this discursive frame blames many problems in the Cuban
economy on U.S. sanctions.
Exile-speak maintains a weakening grasp on Miami, owns U.S. foreign
policy on Cuba, and permeates much of the U.S. legal literature. Home to
exile-speak's organic intellectuals, Miami's educational institutions have
contributed to this condition. This Article does not try to refute the claims of
exile-speak. Nor does it argue away the contradictions of island-speak or
catalogue all aggressions of the United States toward Cuba which might give
rise to liability.
For decades, these two ethnic pools Cubans would develop with respect
to but virtually separate from each other, ironic given their physical proxim-
ity. Cuban-Americans, especially those in Miami, developed a distinctive
identity. Island Cubans also developed a distinctive identity. The sense that
something was changing began when Fidel Castro handed leadership of
Cuba to his brother, Raul Castro. The younger brother began to make
changes, especially after the publication in 2011 of the Lineamientos. On
December 17, 2014, change became bilateral when the leaders of both coun-
tries announced that they would resume diplomatic relations, signaling the
end of the status quo.
Fidel Castro's death in 2016 signaled a new phase. In Cuba, official
media spoke not about his death but about his "physical disappearance,"
leaving clear that his role as totemic father of the Revolution would con-
tinue. In Miami, Cuban-Americans on Calle Ocho celebrated his death rau-
cously, attracting the attention of a stunned world. 21' Soon thereafter,
President Obama put an end to the special treatment that Cuban refugees had
always received under the Cuban Adjustment Act. 25 2 Next year, Raul Castro
leaves the Presidency, raising questions about how elections will be con-
ducted and who will be his successor. Each of these events confirms the
sense that a protracted chapter of the past is beginning to end.
These changes mean that a synthesis of these hitherto antagonistic iden-
tities becomes possible. For some, the long-standing segregation between
Cuban-Americans grounded in the United States and Cubans rooted on the
island is coming to an end. In my opinion, that synthesis should take place
in Cuba without interference by meddlesome foreign powers, because the
dialectic is essentially one between Cubans and Cuban-Americans. At pre-
sent, what keeps Cuban-Americans and Cubans apart is the ongoing antago-
ing for more political pluralism, but they are probably not the human rights celebrities backed
by the U.S.A.I.D.
251 1 was in Havana when Fidel Castro died, so, happily, I missed the gruesome demon-
strations of glee among Cuban-American exiles in Miami, scenes of which left many Cubans
on the island feeling personally insulted. See Lizette Alvarez, Miami's Cuban Exiles Celebrate
Castro's Death, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/26/us/miami-
cubans-fidel-castro.html?_r=0, archived at https://perma.cc/5X6H-5EB9.
252 See Press Release, The White House, Statement by the President on Cuban Immigra-
tion Policy (Jan. 12, 2017), available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office
/2017/01/12/statement-president-cuban-immigration-policy, archived at https://perma.cclRD8
T-GXHB.
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nism of Cuba and the United States. At the heart of this antagonism is the
political risk stand-off between the certified claims of the United States and
Cuba's claim for sanctions damages. The claims resolution considered in
this Article is part of that process. This Article has tried to break out of the
exile/island binary by clearing a field in which contentious claims about ex-
propriation, sanctions, political risk, economic harm, and causation can be
explored.

